A Theory of Bureaucracy
In this paper an attempt is made to describe a theory of bureaucratic decisionmaking aimed at achieving predictability. The theory is based upon the fundamental hypothesis that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time. Therefore, this theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith forward, and is consistent with recent contributions to political science made by such writers as Simmel, Truman, Schattschneider, Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, Simon, and March.
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