Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and BeyondHow can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 6 | |
THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK | 27 |
THE PROBLEM OF TERRORIST SURPRISE ATTACK | 85 |
Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets 19872012 | 185 |
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9/11 Commission Report 9/11 Commission Staff Afghanistan al-Qaeda American intelligence analysis argues arrested assessments attack on Pearl August Battle of Midway Betts cell Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency chapter codebreaking commanders Dar es Salaam Day of Terror decision makers described embassy bombings example failed Fleet gence Hawaii hijacking Ibid Inquiry Staff Statement intelligence agencies intelligence community intelligence failure intelligence officials intelligence reporting intelligence success intercepted invasion Israeli Joint Inquiry Report Joint Inquiry Staff June Laden later Layton leaders military Mohamed Nairobi National Intelligence National Security Agency Naval Navy Nimitz Nosair operation Osama Bin Laden policymakers Prange prevent surprise attacks problem Rahman receptive Research History SRH Review Rochefort Salem senior September 11 Siddig sources Soviet Special Research History specific strategic intelligence Strategic Surprise strategic warning strategic-level tactical-level tactical-level intelligence target terrorist attacks terrorist threat told United Washington Wohlstetter World Trade Center York