Fritz, as I say, is better here than we ever dreamed of. In camps, all cooks are pretty fair. Now they are either wonders or worthless. Fritz instead of whining, that the reason we only have beans for a meal is because the supply company didn't bring him this or that, or that we had marched too much, or that shelled communications kept back the fuel, digs in, boils water from a shell hole, picks berries in the brush, gets flour (probably stolen months ago) out of his "stoff" and presents us a blackberry pie or pancakes. Our favorite story is about the time he made baking powder biscuits under fire. We didn't have any dugouts; the men were in a drainage ditch which ran alongside a shed in which Fritz found a stove. During a lull he got a fire going and made the dough. Then the shelling began again. We lay there (we of the staff doing business by the telephone from an undignified but desirable "belly flop" position) and watched Fritz, who is a regular cricket. He would climb out of the ditch, push a pan one place, twist a stick or change pans. A shell would be heard coming and when it would land Fritz would land simultaneously in the ditch. And in this game, where hours for eating or sleeping are unknown, he is ideal, for he loves to feed the hungry in the middle of the night and is always ready with coffee.

Thursday, October 3, 1918.

Official Diary

Corporal Cornelius De Ruyter, Hqrs. Co. seriously wounded by H. E. shell. Set up our own wireless station. Boche plane brought down near Regimental P. C. after shooting down one of our observation balloons. "B" Battery claims credit for Pvt Horton's machine gun.

Friday, October 4, 1918.

Big attack launched at 5:00 A. M. Batteries "A" and "B" attached to 4th and 7th Infantry. Battery "B" takes position near Cierges in execution of this mission. Four Boche planes brought down during drive. Corporal Kenneth McHugh, Battery "A" killed in action by explosion of enemy shell at Battery "A". Bugler Richard Brandt, Pvt. Lawrence Brill and Walter Sporisky, all of Battery "A", slightly wounded by H. E. shell. Batttery "A" limbers brought up and stand around all day awaiting orders for infantry mission.

Saturday, October 5, 1918.

O. P. sends in important observations and Batteries "A" and "B" fire with favorable results observed from O. P. Pvts. Clifford Hearn and Burl Slocum, Battery "B", slightly wounded yesterday. Batteries "A" and "B" released from infantry missions and "B" returns to position at Fayel Farme after dark.

Sunday, October 6, 1918.

At request of 159th Brigade we fire 900 rounds on objectives in sector to our right. Regimental P. C. shelled some today. Battalion Headquarters and Batteries, after reconnaisance, move at dark to next sector on left and rejoin 32nd Division. Batteries go into positions in orchard about a kilometer north of Epinonville. Our wireless picks up the news that Germany, Austria and Turkey have asked for an armistice.

G-3.

31

MEMORANDUM NO. 324.

SUBJECT: Use of tanks in liaison with Infantry.

3rd Division P. C. France, Oct. 3, 1918.

I Report of Major Mare, Commanding 5th Corps Tanks, on the use of tanks in liaison with infantry.

1. From all the information received from my units, I gather that the intimate liaison which should exist between the attacking infantry and the tanks is far from being realized. In many cases there is no liaison at all, probably on account of the fact that the infantry is ignorant of the means of fighting with tanks.

2. It happens almost constantly that Infantry Commanders make the tanks attack very far in advance of their first line and are slow in taking possession of ground. 3.

In certain cases, they do not even come and take possession of the ground gained by the tanks, even when these positions are very important.

4. Thus, NANTILLOIS and vicinity, taken by the 343rd and 344th Companies of the 15th B. C. L. (15th Bn. Light Tanks), on the evening of the 27th, was not occupied by the infantry (315th Regt.) which settled down 1500 meters to the south. 5. On account of this fact, NANTILLOIS had to be taken again on the morning of the 28th.

6. It is absolutely necessary that the Infantry leaders should thoroughly understand these absolute principles of the use of Tanks:

(A) Tanks are used only en masse (minimum of a section.)

(B) Tanks should be sent ahead of the Infantry only when centers of resistance are clearly determined. When there is uncertainty it is the infantry which should find out by its own means.

(C) When the tanks move forward to attack the known centers of resistance, the infantry should follow the tanks very closely, in order to profit by their action and in order to occupy the ground gained.

(D) In order to do this the infantry must follow the tanks at about 200 meters
and as soon as the Boche is destroyed or has hunted his hole, the infantry goes
forward to occupy the ground.

(E) Act quickly so that the Boche shall not have time to recover himself.
(F) The infantry should make it a point of honor never to leave the tanks
alone, especially in the enemy's hands.

(G) If the tanks are surrounded, fire on the enveloping troops with rifles or
machine guns until they are disengaged.

(H) In no case should the infantry fall back if it sees the tanks going to the rear in order to get a fresh supply of gasoline or ammunition.

(I) Infantry which has occupied ground must not keep the tanks in front of it as sentinels. The tanks should be sent away as soon as possible, once the machine guns and light machine guns are in place.

(J) Tanks cannot attack or counter attack at night, they do not see clearly and can be of no service. They can only risk being taken or firing on friendly troops.

By Command of Major General BUCK.

SUPPLEMENT TO SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

(For distribution down to Battalions)

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT
(From 1st Army Summary of Intelligence Oct. 5, 1918)

"Meuse Group East
General, Commanding Reserve Corps

Lessons to be Drawn from Fighting
on West Bank of the Meuse.

Army Corps, 9/29/18

1. The American Infantry is very unskilled in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by tanks. This sort of attack offers excellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine guns.

On condition that the infantry does not allow itself to be intimidated by the advancing masses and that it remains calm, it can make excellent use of its arms, and the American attacks fail with the heaviest losses. For example, the 150th Regiment of the 37th Infantry Division yesterday repelled 10 American attacks and today 3, without losing any ground and suffering relatively light losses.

The Americans are very much afraid of the artillery fire and especially gas shells. A few yellow cross shells are sufficient to start the gas alarm and considerable confusion. Therefore, it is recommended to continue the use of the salvos of yellow cross shells, especally during the night.

As to the American tanks, the troops after recovering from their first fright have been able to defend themselves excellently. Hence the tanks no longer possess any great combat value. The infantry allows them to approach and fires on them with the machine guns (ammunition S. m. K.) and with rifles (ammunition M. s. K.) and artillery by direct fire. The tanks for the most part retreat. If they continue to advance, the infantry remains quiet in its position and leaves to the artillery the task of combating them. Several times it has happened that the tanks have been put out of commission by grenades thrown through the loop holes by the infantry. The infantry must always be assured that tanks have no individual combat power and that the danger from them is lessened after the infantry is not afraid of them.

Usually the American infantry has followed the tanks at some distance so that our infantry has had time to first take care of the tanks, then of the infantry that follows them. The general opinion of the troops of the Meuse West Group is that the American troops are not a dangerous adversary when their method of fighting is known before hand.

The divisions will see to it that these remarks are brought to the knowledge of the troops immediately, and that today if possible.

Monday, October 7, 1918.

Official Diary

s/v. SODEN.

Regimental P. C. moves to Bois Emont near batteries north of Epinonville. Capt. Arnold, Adjutant 128 Infantry and his Sergeant Major killed, and many others. killed and wounded in Epinonville just before we pass through. We meet Lt. Benson, 121st F. A. who is a M. G. instructor at one of the schools and has been sent up for

a tour of duty at the front and he decides to spend his "vacation" with us. We occupy some partly dismantled German shacks in the woods. The Germans shoot over considerable H. E. and gas. One of the 119th F. A. batteries moves in close to Battery "A", and "A" prepares to move forward a few hundred meters. While the new position is being prepared Captain Swift is seriously wounded by H. E. and while Lt. George D. Harris is assisting to remove Capt. Swift, he is also seriously wounded. Lieutenant Ralph H. Pierce now in command of firing battery.

Tuesday, October 8, 1918.

Everybody shelled heavily this A. M. Echelon now located southeast of Very. Newspapers arrive.

Wednesday, October 9, 1918.

Heavy preparatory fire continues all night. Infantry over the top at 8:25 A. M. Batteries fire until 12:30 P. M. Ist Lieutenant Theodore Phalen, Telephone Instructor Artillery School, La Courtine, France, formerly of Troop M, and Headquarters Co., 120 F. A. reports for a week of duty with regiment. Battalion and battery officers go on reconnaisance for positions near Gesnes. Nothing doing on account of M. G. fire.