Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science
Oxford University Press, 1999 - Science - 352 pages
Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science features an impressive collection of classical and contemporary readings on a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science. The volume is organized into six sections, each with its own introduction, and includes a general introduction that situates the philosophy of science in relation to other areas of intellectual inquiry. The selections focus on the main issues in the field, including the structure of scientific theories, models of scientific explanation, reductionism, historicist challenges to the objectivity of science, and the dispute over the ontological interpretation of mature scientific theories. Both the positivist model of science and its competitors, including contemporary social constructivist models, are included. Ideal for introductory philosophy of science courses, Scientific Inquiry strives to provide students and other readers with a thorough knowledge of the philosophical complexity of modern science and an appreciation of its authoritative intellectual standing in contemporary life.
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Part I The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories and Its Problems
Problems with the ObservationalTheoretical Distinction
A Defense of the ObservationalTheoretical Distinction
23 other sections not shown
accept argues argument assertions assumptions Bas van Fraassen beliefs bridge laws Cambridge Carnap causal claim concept covariance crobes definition dependence derivation discussion distinction doctrine empirical ence entails entities epistemic epistemology event evidence example existence experience experimental explanation explanatory explication expressions fact feminist formulated Fraassen gender given Hempel Hilary Putnam holism hypothesis idea interpretation kind predicates language logical logical positivism mathematical means mental metaphysical micro-reductions molecules nature nomological notion objects observation terms ontological Oppenheim paradigm phenomena philosophy of science physical positivism positivist possible postulates principle problem properties psychological question Quine Quine's rational realism reality Received View reduced reductionism refer relation scientific theories scientists sense data sentences social specific statements strong covariance Strong Programme supervenience testable theoretical terms thesis things tion true truth underdetermination Unity of Science universe of discourse University Press unobservable vocabulary W.V. Quine weak covariance