The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory

David J. Chalmers

OUP USA, 1996 - Medical - 414 pages

What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we
have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this
heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain.
Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from
physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity (similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its
parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly
illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced,
will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how the author's theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
All of us have pondered the nature and meaning of consciousness. Engaging and penetrating, The Conscious Mind adds a fresh new perspective to the subject that is sure to spark debate about our understanding of the mind for years to come.

What people are saying

LibraryThing Review

User Review  - ddowell - LibraryThing

A disappointing book. Chalmer's willingness to propose specious arguments is surprising for a serious intellectual. He argues from admittedly counter-factual examples as if they provided evidence. He ...

A Great Place to Start!

User Review  - Dopey Gigglz - Borders

David Chalmers sent shockwaves through the philosophical world with this 1996 release. In it he baptizes the phrase "Hard Problem of Consciousness" which has been at the forefront of consciousness ...

Contents

• Two Concepts of Mind: 3
• 2 The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind: 11
• 3 The double life of mental terms: 16
• 4 The two mindbody problems: 24
• 5 Two concepts of consciousness: 25
• Supervenience and Explanation: 32
• 2 Reductive explanation: 42
• 3 Logical supervenience and reductive explanation: 47
• 4 Conceptual truth and necessary truth: 52
• 5 Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical: 71
• Can Consciousness Reductively Explained?: 93
• 2 The failure of reductive explanation: 106
• 3 Cognitive modeling: 111
• 4 Neurobiological explanation: 115
• 5 The appeal to new physics: 118
• 6 Evolutionary explanation: 120
• 7 Whither reductive explanation?: 121
• Naturalistic Dualism: 123
• 2 Objections from a posteriori necessity: 131
• 3 Other arguments for dualism: 140
• 4 Is this epiphenomenalism?: 150
• 5 The logical geography of the issues: 161
• 6 Reflections on naturalistic dualism: 168
• The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment: 172
• 2 The paradox of phenomenal judgment: 177
• 3 On explaining phenomenal judgments: 184
• 4 Arguments against explanatory irrelevance: 191
• 5 The Argument from selfknowledge: 192
• 6 The argument from memory: 200
• 7 The argument from reference: 201
• 8 The content of phenomenal beliefs: 203
• The Coherence Between Consciousness and Cognition: 213
• 2 Principles of coherence: 218
• 3 More on the notion of awareness: 225
• 4 The explanatory role of coherence principles: 233
• 5 Coherence as a psychophysical law: 242
• Absent Qualia Fading Qualia Dancing Qualia: 247
• 2 Absent qualia: 251
• 3 Fading qualia: 253
• 4 Inverted qualia: 263
• 5 Dancing qualia: 266
• 6 Nonreductive functionalism: 274
• Consciousness and Information Some Speculation: 276
• 2 Aspects of information: 277
• 3 Some supporting arguments: 287
• 4 Is experience ubiquitous?: 293
• 5 The metaphysics of information: 301
• 6 Open questions: 308
• Strong Artificial Intelligence: 313
• 2 On implementing a computation: 315
• 3 In defense of strong AI: 320
• 4 The Chinese room and other objections: 322
• 5 External objections: 328
• 6 Conclusion: 331
• The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: 333
• 2 The framework of quantum mechanics: 334
• 3 Interpreting quantum mechanics: 337
• 4 The Everett interpretation: 346
• 5 Objections to the Everett interpretation: 351
• 6 Conclusion: 356
• Notes: 359
• Bibliography: 391
• Index: 405

Popular passages

Page 263 - ... the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time ; vg if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes, were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice versd.‎

Page 263 - Though one man's idea of blue should be different from another's. NEITHER would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our simple ideas, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that the same object should produce in sfveral men's ,minds different ideas at the same time...‎

Page 12 - The fact that nothing can exist in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not...‎

Page 3 - Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon; it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it.‎

Page 4 - consciousness', an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as 'phenomenal consciousness...‎

Page 12 - As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-evident. For there is nothing that we can understand to be in the mind, regarded in this way, that is not a thought or dependent on a thought.‎

Page 360 - Notice that the italicized words, namely "there is something going on which is like what is going on when," are all quasilogical or topic-neutral words. This explains why the ancient Greek peasant's reports about his sensations can be neutral between dualistic metaphysics or my materialistic metaphysics.‎

Page 360 - ... physical objects, events, and processes which normally, though not perhaps in the present instance, give rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to describe. In other words when we describe the after-image as green, we are not saying that there is something, the after-image, which is green; we are saying that we are having the sort of experience which we normally have when, and which we have learned to describe as, looking at a green patch of light.‎

Page 258 - As the silicon is progressively implanted into your dwindling brain, you find that the area of your conscious experience is shrinking, but that this shows no effect on your external behavior. You find, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior ... [You have become blind, but] you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control, 'I see a red object in front of me.‎

Page 95 - conscious" in the functional senses described earlier — he will be awake, able to report the contents of his internal states, able to focus attention in various places, and so on. It is just that none of this functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There will be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.‎

About the author

David J. Chalmers is a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His article "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience" appeared in the December 1995 issue ofScientific American.

Bibliographic information

• Title: The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory; Oxford paperbacks; Philosophy of Mind
• Author: David J. Chalmers
• Edition: illustrated, reprint, revised
• Publisher: OUP USA, 1996
• ISBN: 0195117891, 9780195117899
• Length: 414 pages
• Subjects: Medical / Neurology; Philosophy / Metaphysics; Philosophy / Mind & Body; Philosophy / Movements / Humanism; Psychology / Cognitive Psychology & Cognition; Science / Life Sciences / Neuroscience