European Republic: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future ConstitutionPart of a broader project on the impact of European Monetary Union (EMU), carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation in co-operation with the Center for Applied Policy Research at the University of Munich, this project, "The Consequences of the Euro," focuses on modeling a European political system able to live up to the changes as well as the risks involved in handling a common currency. Stefan Collignon reflects on the political economy of a future European constitution. He explores in particular the elusive economic and monetary policy mix that is called for within the developing framework of European integration, the issues of fiscal federalism and subsidiarity, and contrasting voluntary policy co-ordination. He also balances the demands of the Stability and Growth Pact with the embryonic consensual foundations of a European welfare function. Professor Collignon argues that collective action problems require a courageous step forward in creating coherent governance structures for the Union and that it has become essential to give European citizens their democratic right to political autonomy, taking the European "common concern" out of the sole hands of national governments.--Publisher description. |
Contents
List of Figures and Tables | 24 |
Chapter Four | 32 |
1 Global Population Distribution | 45 |
Copyright | |
12 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
The European Republic: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future ... Stefan Collignon No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
acceptance allocation Althusius argument assignment background benefits budget centralising Chapter coherent collective action collective preferences Collignon communitarian conflict constitutional consensus constitutive rules context costs Council create cultural debate decentralising federalism decision-making deficit defined democracy dissent economic efficient emergence epistemic constituency equilibrium Europe Europe's European Central Bank European citizens European collective European Commission European Constitution European Council European government European integration European level European Parliament European policy European Union evaluation externalities fiscal federalism fiscal policy function Hence holistic ideologies implies individual institutions intergovernmental issues jurisdictions Maastricht Treaty macroeconomic modern monetary market economy monetary policy mutual respect nation-state national governments normative content optimal outcomes policy co-ordination policy consensus policy decisions policy deliberation policy domain policy mix policy preferences political principle procedures pure public reflect requires single market social society sovereignty stabilisation stabilisation policies stochastic consensus structures subsidiarity theory traditional Treaty type-II-inefficiencies values voting welfare