The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion.
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accidental necessity accidentally necessary act at t5 actual world Adams affairs Alvin Plantinga antecedent Anthony Kenny Aquinas argued aseity B-theory Barbara next Thursday Boethian Boethian solution Boethius causal necessity causal relation causally contingent causally necessary Chapter choice claim compatibilist counterexample counterfactual conditional counterfactually depend counterfactuals of freedom deny divine foreknowledge entails essentially omniscient example existence expressed false Flatland foreknower foreknowledge dilemma foreknowledge problem Freddoso future contingents go to Santa God's foreknowledge God’s belief God’s knowing God’s knowledge God’s past beliefs Hasker infallible intuition Jones kind of necessity logical fatalism Marilyn Adams metaphysical middle knowledge modal Molinist necessary truth necessity per accidens Necessity Principle object Ockham Ockhamist ontological past and future philosophers Plantinga plausible possible worlds potency power to bring present prior reason Section seems sense soft fact Spaceland strictly equivalent subjunctive conditionals suppose theological fatalism things Thomistic timelessly Transfer of Necessity
Page 2 - I formed them free, and free they must remain, Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change Their nature, and revoke the high decree Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained Their freedom, they themselves ordained their fall.
Page 3 - I have a deep desire to know how it can be that God knows all things beforehand and that, nevertheless, we do not sin by necessity. Whoever says that anything can happen otherwise than as God has foreknown it, is attempting to destroy the divine foreknowledge with the most insensate impiety. If God foreknew that the first man would sin — and that anyone must concede who acknowledges with me that God has foreknowledge of all future...