Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy
In his ground-breaking book, the leading political philosopher Russell Hardin develops a new theory of liberal constitutional democracy. Arguing against the standard consensus theories, the author shows how social co-ordination on limited, sociological mutual advantage lies at the heart ofliberal constitutionalism when it works to produce stable government.The book argues that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy are co-ordination theories. They work only in societies in which co-ordination of the important power groups for mutual advantage is feasible. It then goes on to examine and interpret the US constitution as motivated centrally by theconcern with creating a government to enable commerce. In addition, the book addresses the nature of the problems that the newly democratic, newly market-oriented states face. The analysis of constitutionalism is based on its workability, not on its intrinsic, normative, or universal appeals. Hardinargues, similarly, there are harsh limits on the possibilities of democracy. In general, democracy works only on the margins of great issues. Indeed, it is inherently a device for regulating marginal political conflicts.
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1st pub action agreement American Anti-Federalists argued argument Articles of Confederation benefit Cambridge central Chapter Chicago choice citizens claim Commerce Clause communitarian concern conflict consent theory constitutionalism contractarian convention coordination debate democracy democratic deontological discussed Eastern economic liberalism economic transitions egalitarian election enforcement ernment ethnic example expectations farmers Federalist Federalist Papers growth Hamilton Hence Hobbes Hobbes's ical illiberal incentives individual institutions interests issue Jefferson John liberty Madison major medias res ment merely Mill moral mutual advantage national government nomic normative numbers outcome Oxford perhaps Philadelphia Philadelphia Convention plantation agrarians plausible political and economic political liberalism popular sovereignty principle prisoner's dilemma problem production protection reason reform regime relatively religious require Russell Hardin self-enforcing sense social contract society sovereign Soviet supposed theorists theory tion Tocqueville typically United University Press utilitarian virtually vision vote welfare welfare liberalism welfarist York
Governance-Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen: eine Einführung
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Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics
Robert B. Talisse
Limited preview - 2005