The Evolution of Political Knowledge: Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International Politics
Ohio State University Press, 2004 - Political Science - 391 pages
Over the course of the last century, political scientists have been moved by two principal purposes. First, they have sought to understand and explain political phenomena in a way that is both theoretically and empirically grounded. Second, they have analyzed matters of enduring public interest, whether in terms of public policy and political action, fidelity between principle and practice in the organization and conduct of government, or the conditions of freedom, whether of citizens or of states. Many of the central advances made in the field have been prompted by a desire to improve both the quality and our understanding of political life. Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in research on comparative politics and international relations, fields in which concerns for the public interest have stimulated various important insights. This volume systematically analyzes the major developments within the fields of comparative politics and international relations over the past three decades. Each chapter is composed of a core paper that addresses the major puzzles, conversations, and debates that have attended major areas of concern and inquiry within the discipline. These papers examine and evaluate the intellectual evolution and natural history of major areas of political inquiry and chart particularly promising trajectories, puzzles, and concerns for future work. Each core paper is accompanied by a set of shorter commentaries that engage the issues it takes up, thus contributing to an ongoing and lively dialogue among key figures in the field.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
actors American politics analysis Anderson argue argument assumptions behavior brinkmanship capita income citizens Cold War comparative politics competition concerns coordination coordination game countries course cultural debate democracy democratic dependent variables deterrence dictatorships discipline distribution district domestic Downsian dynamic economic growth effect election rules electoral empirical epistemology equality equilibrium essay ethnic conflict ethnic groups explain field focus game theory globalization Hardin Horowitz human capital impact important increase individual inequality influence interest international relations investment issues Jervis John Roemer Krasner laissez-faire Laitin Nash equilibrium norms nuclear weapons organizations outcomes party percent policy space policymaking political institutions political science political scientists positions Powell preferences problem Przeworski question rates rational choice rational choice theory regime type representatives result Roemer scholars security studies social sovereignty Soviet strategy structure substantive suggests theoretical theorists theory tion tional vote-seat votes