Sensations: A Defense of Type MaterialismThis is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists. |
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Contents
Topics and themes | 3 |
The failings of dualism and the doubleaspect theory | 19 |
The failings of functionalism | 44 |
In defense of type materialism | 83 |
Introspective awareness of sensations | 117 |
Introspection and the skeptic | 139 |
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Common terms and phrases
According actual analytic answer appearances argument ascribing associated attending aware behavior beliefs brain called causal cause certain chapter characteristics claim clear conceive concept concerned conclusion condition consciousness consider consists correct correlation count defend determine dualism effect evidence example exemplifies existence experience explanation expressed fact follows functional functional property functional role functionalists give human hypothesis identical immediate implies individual instances internal introspection intuitions involving justified kind laws logically look maintain mean mind namely nature necessary normal objection observations occur one's pain perception phenomenal philosophers physical plays position possible premise present principle probability problem proposition psychological qualitative qualitative characteristics question reason refer relations role satisfy seems sensations sense sensory similar simplicity situation skeptic sort stand state-type suppose theory thesis things third tions token true type materialism unity University
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Bibliographic information
| Title | Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism Cambridge Studies in Philosophy |
| Author | Christopher S. Hill |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, 1991 |
| ISBN | 0521394236, 9780521394239 |
| Length | 264 pages |
| Subjects | › Philosophy / Logic Philosophy / Mind & Body |
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