Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism

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Cambridge University Press, Jan 25, 1991 - Philosophy - 264 pages
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This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.
 

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Contents

Topics and themes
3
The failings of dualism and the doubleaspect theory
19
The failings of functionalism
44
In defense of type materialism
83
Introspective awareness of sensations
117
Introspection and the skeptic
139
Their semantic
159
Their content and their
186
Knowledge of other minds
209
Unity of consciousness other minds and phenomenal
228
Index
245
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