Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation
Over the past two decades, the field of law and economics has matured to the point where scholars have employed the latest economic methods in an effort to understand the nature of legal rules and to suggest how these rules could be reformed. This book is the first to provide a broad survey of this scholarship as it has been applied to problems in tort law, contract law, property law, and litigation. Because of its broad coverage, the book will serve as a convenient reference guide for researchers in the field, a rigorous introduction for economists interested in learning about law and economics, and a useful teaching tool for graduate and advanced undergraduate law and economics courses.
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The Economics of Tort Law The Basic Model
The Economics of Tort Law Extensions
The Economics of Contract Law Remedies for Breach
The Economics of Contract Law Mistake Impossibility and Other Doctrines
The Economics of Property Law
Government Taking and Regulation of Private Property
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adverse possession argued argument assume bargaining behavior breach decision buyer choice choose Coase theorem comparative negligence compensating precaution consider context contingent fee contract contributory negligence Cooter and Ulen court defendant defendant’s discovery doctrine due standard efficient breach eminent domain enforcement English rule equilibrium ex ante ex post examine example expectation damages expected costs expected value file suit first-order condition frivolous litigation frivolous suits given go to trial impact implies incentive increase induce efficient injurer's investment Landes and Posner landowner last clear chance laundry legal error legitimate suits liability rules liquidated damage litigation costs maximize minimize modification negligence rule Note outcome owner parties plaintiff Polinsky probability problem promisee promisor property rules regulation reliance remedy result risk sharing seller settle settlement amount settlement rate Shavell strategic strict liability suppose threshold tion transaction costs uncertainty unilateral-care untaken precaution yields zero