What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
action activity actual advance already altogether analysis apperception Aristotle association attention Bain become body called Cartesian dualism certainly character characteristics characterology colour comparable complex conation concept concerned concrete individual connexion continuity continuum deﬁnite Descartes described determined difference differentiation distinct distinguish doctrine effect emotional epistemological experience F. H. Bradley fact feeling ﬁnd ﬁrst further Herbart Herbartian Herbert Spencer heredity higher Hume ideas ideational images implies impressions intellection intensity intuition J. S. Mill Kant knowledge Leibniz less localised logical means memory mental ments merely mind motor presentations movements nature never object organic sensations pain perception perhaps persons pleasure position possible presentations presupposes principle Principles of Psychology psychical psycho psychology question realise recognise regarded relation repetitions result seems self-consciousness sense sensory shew so-called spatial speciﬁc standpoint subjective selection supposed syllables synthesis term things thought tion unity whole words Wundt
Page 202 - And Jacob went near unto Isaac his father; and he felt him, and said, The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.
Page 418 - There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved.
Page 270 - Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that...
Page 372 - SECONDLY, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without...
Page 118 - And the poor beetle that we tread upon, In corporal sufferance finds a pang as great As when a giant dies.
Page 468 - Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace, Have no delight to pass away the time, Unless to spy my shadow in the sun And descant on mine own deformity: And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, To entertain these fair well-spoken days, I am determined to prove a villain And hate the idle pleasures of these days.
Page 39 - If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Page 369 - We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.
Page 14 - Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities ; mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena ; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to...
Page 341 - Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses.