## Game Theory: Analysis of ConflictGame theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty. |

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - PaolaM - LibraryThingThis is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Read full review

### Contents

Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |

Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |

Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |

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### Common terms and phrases

8-discounted average argmax assumption average payoff axiom Bayesian game behavioral strategy behavioral-strategy profile belief probabilities best response choose condition consider cooperative correlated equilibrium correlated strategy decision-maker defined denote the set disagreement efficient equation equilib example expected payoff expected utility extensive-form game feasible game in Figure game in strategic game theory games with incomplete given implement incentive constraints incomplete information individually rational Kakutani fixed-point theorem linear maximize mediation plan move multiagent representation Myerson Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium negotiate node nonempty offer optimal option outcome Pareto efficient payoff allocation payoff to player positive number positive probability probability distribution pure strategies randomized strategy randomized-strategy profile repeated game round satisfy scenario Section seller sequential equilibrium sequentially rational set of players Shapley value solution concept specifies strategic form strategic-form game strategy for player strategy profile subgame subgame-perfect equilibrium subset suppose theorem transferable utility unique utility function utility payoff weakly dominated