The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to "Pragmatism,"

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Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909 - Reality - 297 pages
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Page 40 - And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.
Page 40 - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
Page vii - The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas. The 'absolutely...
Page vi - The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.
Page 116 - We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing wave,crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path.
Page 124 - I conceive the situation, is to have seen that tho one part of our experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as a whole is selfcontaining and leans on nothing.
Page 285 - It may be said — and this is, I believe, the correct view — that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood ; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white...
Page 210 - Pragmata" are things in their plurality; and in that early California address, when I described pragmatism as holding that "the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether passive or active," I expressly added these qualifying words: "the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact that it must be active...
Page 117 - Our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a more that continuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds.
Page 36 - In the last analysis, then, we believe that we all know and think about and talk about the same world, because we believe our PERCEPTS are possessed by us in common.

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