The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson
Oxford University Press, May 1, 2015 - Philosophy - 456 pages
Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics. The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.
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action affairs aggregation alternative analysis Archimedean property argued argument attitude axiology better Broome bundle Cambridge University Press capabilities approach chapter choice claim comparability concept condition consequentialism consequentialist consider constraints Cost-Benefit Analysis desire discussion distinction e-objects egalitarianism emotions equally Ethics evaluative example exist extrinsic fact final value fittingness freedom G. E. Moore happiness Harsanyi’s Theorem hedonism implies incommensurability incomparability individual individual’s instrumental value intrinsic value intuition Kaldor-Hicks efficient kind least lives monism Moore Moore’s moral normative notion object one’s opportunity set options ordering organic unities outcome Oxford University Press Pareto principle Parfit person Person-Affecting person-based approach Philosophical plausible pleasure pluralism possible preferences Principia Ethica principle prioritarianism problem prudential value question Rabinowicz relation relevant repugnant conclusion respect Rønnow-Rasmussen sense strongly superior substantive Suppose things tion utilitarianism utility function valuable value bearers value theory virtue weakly superior welfare worse Zimmerman