Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy
David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little, Brad Hooker
OUP Oxford, 2013 - Philosophy - 349 pages
Thinking about Reasons is a collection of fourteen new essays on topics in ethics and the philosophy of action, inspired in one way or another by the work of Jonathan Dancy—one of his generation's most influential moral philosophers. Many of the most influential living thinkers in the area are contributors to this collection, which also contains an autobiographical afterword by Dancy himself. Topics discussed in this volume include: · the idea that the facts that explain action are non-psychological ones · buck passing theories of goodness and rightness · the idea that some moral reasons justify action without requiring it · the particularist idea that there are no true informative moral principles · the idea that egoism and impartial consequentialism are self-defeating · the idea that moral reasons are dependent on either impersonal value, or benefits to oneself, or benefits to those with whom one has some special connection, but not on deontological constraints · the idea that we must distinguish between reasons and enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators of reasons · the idea that, although the lived ethical life is shaped by standing commitments, uncodifable judgement is at least sometimes needed to resolve what to do when these commitments conflict · the idea that the value of a whole need not be a mathematical function of the values of the parts of that whole · the idea that practical reasoning is based on inference the idea that there cannot be irreducibly normative properties.
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1 Acting in the Light of a Fact
2 Can Action Explanations Ever Be NonFactive?
3 The Ideal of Orthonomous Action or the How and Why of BuckPassing
4 Dancy on BuckPassing
5 Are Egoism and Consequentialism SelfRefuting?
6 In Defence of NonDeontic Reasons
7 The Deontic Structure of Morality
Ethical Not Metaphysical?
10 A Quietist Particularism
11 Contours of the Practical Landscape
12 Why Holists Should Love Organic Unities
13 Practical Reasoning and Inference
14 Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties
8 Morality and Principle
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agent agent-relative agential reasons argue ascribe attend the conference believe buck-passing ç-ing Cambridge circumstances claim cognitivism conception consequentialism consequentialist considerations constraint contribute value correct Dancy’s argument deontic reasons deontic structure deontological descriptive properties disjunctive distinction enablers entails Ethics example explain fact G. E. M. Anscombe give highest common factor holism idea identical to descriptive illocutionary force intention intentional object irreducibly normative properties Jackson’s argument Jonathan Dancy judgement kind McDowell Metaethics metaphysics modus ponens moral obligation Moral Particularism moral reasons necessarily coextensive non-instrumental desires non-reductive realists normative reasons object one’s organic unities Oxford University Press Parfit particularist person Philosophy plausible position practical reasons predicate principles pro tanto quasi-inference question rational reason to act reason-giving reasons for action register in advance reject relation relevant requirements response rule Scanlon sense simply someone suggests supervenience suppose theory things true truth wrong