Mind the gap promoting a transatlantic revolution in military affairs
When American defense officials meet informally with their allies and friends from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, the conversation often turns to the growing disparity in combat capability between European and U.S. forces. The problem is bemoaned, but the participants are not stirred to action. This is unfortunate. We need a cross-Atlantic debate that seeks feasible solutions to this problem. Mind the Gap responds directly to that need. It not only dissects the problem of a growing disparity but also rejects its inevitability. Instead, it lays out a multitiered strategy for its solution which is specific and practical, including processes and procedures for implementation. The proposed strategy is complicated and would be difficult to execute; it would raise questions and even objections. That is as it should be. The alliance, nevertheless, has solved larger, more complex problems. We urgently need to find a way to close the gap because the problem is getting worse. The United States continues to implement its vision of a globally mobile military force equipped with the latest technology. The European members of NATO are not investing in similar capabilities. As a result, the gap will widen and be increasingly difficult to close.
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ability able Adantic alliance allied forces American architecture ARRC assets Atlantic RMA battlefield battlespace Bosnia C4ISR challenges CJTFs close the gap coalition Cold War combat command convergence cooperation defense and information defense industry defense systems deploy divergence divisions effective enemy Euro Europe European allies European defense European forces European militaries fense firepower global interests goal ground forces important improve information technology industry information technology market integrated interoperability investment major ments military capabilities Mind the Gap missiles missions mobile National Defense University NATO Grid option peacekeeping peans planning political power projection pre-RMA forces problem requirements RMA capabilities RMA forces RMA operations rogue role sensors share Soviet standoff strategic System of Systems target tasks threat tion transatlantic RMA U.S. and allied U.S. and European U.S. forces U.S. Grid U.S. military U.S. RMA U.S. steel U.S.-European United users weapons WMD-armed
Page x - at least 250,000 civilian employees are 12 Business Coalition for Fair Competition |House Military Readiness Subcommittee performing commercial-type activities that do not need to be performed by government personnel.
Page 9 - States, as noted earlier, is poised to harness key information technologies — microelectronics, data networking, and software programming — to create a networked force, using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy, launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons, utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors, managed by intelligent command nodes. By distributing its forces, while still being able to concentrate fires, the US military is improving its mobility, speed, potency, and...
Page 5 - The use of information technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces. The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War, whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type operations that US forces conducted in 1991.
Page 21 - Interests reflect the underlying vulnerabilities and opportunities of a society, and its economic vitality, relative to developments elsewhere in the world. In this sense, Europeans do have global interests — indeed, interests quite similar to those of the United States.
Page 69 - Europeans have some excellent defense and information technologies;22 but overall they are lagging and will fall even further behind as US industry responds to the demands of the RMA.
Page 21 - So the transatlantic disparity in strategic outlook is not really about interests: it is about whether and how to protect them.
Page 5 - Thus, ironically, the more severe the threat to interests shared by the United States and Europe, the less likely that a true US -European coalition will respond.