Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research

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Avalon Publishing, Sep 5, 1997 - Political Science - 318 pages
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Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialist in mind, the author presents a coherent actor-centered model of institutional rational choice that integrates a wide variety of theoretical contributions, such as game theory, negotiation theory, transaction cost economics, international relations, and democratic theory.Games Real Actors Play offers a framework for linking positive theory to the normative issues that necessarily arise in policy research and employs many cross-national examples, including a comparative use of game theory to understand the differing reactions of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the economic stagflation of the 1970s.
 

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Contents

Policy Research in the Face of Complexity
19
ActorCentered Institutionalism
36
Actors
51
Actor Constellations
69
Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions
97
Negotiated Agreements
116
Zero status quo or nonagreement
123
Decisions by Majority Vote
151
A GameTheoretical Interpretation
217
Inflation and unemployment in OECD countries 19731983
218
The union view
225
Historical sequences of coordination and politics games
233
Efficient SelfCoordination in Policy Networks
245
Ideal types of negotiations
253
References
281
About the Book and Author
303

Hierarchical Direction
171
Varieties of the Negotiating State
195

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About the author (1997)

Fritz W. Scharpf is codirector of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, and a former director of the International Institute of Management and Administration, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. He has taught at the Yale Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and at the University of Konstanz. He has published widely on constitutional law, democratic theory, policy formation and policy implementation, political economy, negotiation theory, and game theory.

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