Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813

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University of Oklahoma Press, 2002 - History - 384 pages
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At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In Napoleon and Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleon’s almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany.

Napoleon’s motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussia’s war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleon’s Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever.

 

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User Review  - jcbrunner - LibraryThing

After a truly bad introduction which highlights the author's weak knowledge about European history and military tactics, the book recovers and even delivers a nice operational study about von Bülow's ... Read full review

Contents

France and Prussia
3
The Sixth Coalition
28
The Defense of Berlin
55
Luckau
70
Muskets Saddles and Shoes
89
Axes Spades and Water
104
Plans and Preparations
120
Opening Moves
141
Dennewitz
189
At the Rubicon
212
Crossing the Rubicon
229
Leipzig
256
Conclusion
278
Notes
299
Bibliography
357
Index
371

Grofi Beeren
160
The Politics of Dissension
177

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About the author (2002)

Michael V. Leggiere is Assistant Professor of History at Louisiana State University, Shreveport.

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