Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy
Christoph Lumer, Sandro Nannini
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Jan 1, 2007 - Philosophy - 311 pages
Many important thinkers in the philosophical tradition have used an explicit theory of action as the basis of their respective normative theories of practical rationality and morality. The idea behind this architecture of theories is that action theory can inform us about the origin, bonds, reach and limits of practical reason. The aim of this book is to revive this direct connection between action theory and practical philosophy, in particular to provide systematic action-theoretical underpinnings for the discussion about the normative structure of practical reason. This book brings together a collection of specially commissioned essays from internationally prestigious scholars in the field and represents the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of action. The volume significantly advances these three lines of research and offers important new contributions to each of them.
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Folk Concepts Surveys and Intentional Action
Action and Responsibility A Second Look at Ascriptivism
What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From?
The Double Failure ofDouble Effect
The Will and The Good
The Grounds and Structure of Reasons for Action
An Empirical Theory of Practical Reasons and its Use
Anchors for Deliberation
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action philosophy action sentences action theory action-theoretical agent agential authority ascriptivism attitudes authoritative valuings autonomy Bratman Cambridge causal chains causal theory causalists caused choice claim CNC control cognitive compatibilists condition consequences course of events Davidson DCCs deciding decision decision theory deliberation depends deterministic distinction Donald Davidson empirical ethics example explain externalist fact Fischer and Ravizza Frankfurt freedom Ginet harm the environment ibid incompatibilism intention to flex intentional action intentionally judgments justified kind Knobe libertarian Libet Lumer McCann Mele mental moral responsibility motives normative normative reasons object one's Oxford University Press person philosophy of action philosophy of mind plausible practical philosophy practical rationality practical reasons principle pro-attitudes problem proposition propositional attitudes prospect desirabilities proximal intention psychological question relevant Robert Audi sense specific stability subjects theory of action theory of practical thesis things true ultimate control uncaused urge weak-willed