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actions advantage agreeable animal Anthropomorphites appear approbation argument arises Atheists attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances Cleanthes concerning consider contrary cosmogony degree Deity Demea derived distinct double relation effect emotion entirely esteem evident evil excite execution of justice experience external feel force give greater Hermippus hope and fear human nature hypothesis imagination immediately impossible impressions and ideas infer influence interest judgment justice kind love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner matter ment mind misery moral motive never notion object obligation observe operation original ourselves pain particular passions person Philo philosophers philosophical scepticism pleasure possession present pride and humility pride or humility principles proceed produce promises qualities reason regard relation of ideas relation of impressions religion render resemblance rience rules satisfaction sensation sense sensible sentiments sider sions society sophism species suppose sympathy Theism thing thought tion uneasiness virtuous
Page 166 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Page 231 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ougU, or an ought not.
Page 551 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 440 - When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.
Page 218 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Page 447 - Consider, anatomize the eye, survey its structure and contrivance, and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation.
Page 167 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Page 195 - Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends ; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites.
Page 500 - ... fortunate CATO, protesting in his old age, that, had he a new life in his offer, he would reject the present. Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their lives. No ! but the next twenty, they say, will be better : And from the dregs of life, hope to receive What the first sprightly running could not give.