A Course in Game Theory

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MIT Press, Jul 12, 1994 - Business & Economics - 352 pages
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A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Strategic Games
9
Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated
53
Knowledge and Equilibrium
67
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
87
Bargaining Games
117
Repeated Games
133
Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
163
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
199
Sequential Equilibrium
219
Coalitional Games
255
Stable Sets the Bargaining Set and the Shapley
277
The Nash Solution
299
List of Results
313
References
321
Index
341

Implementation Theory
177

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About the author (1994)

Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University, Israel, and Princeton University.

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