Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.
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Academic moral skepticism Academic skepticism act is morally adequate alternatives argue argument beg the question belief justified beliefs are justified beliefs are true best explanation capital punishment chicken sexer coherent coherentism coherentists confirmation context contractarian crow Dahlia deceiving demon deny depends epistemic ethics committee evidence example explain expressivism expressivists extreme contrast class extremely justified false first-order Fogelin Gauthier Humean hypothesis immoral impartial implies inference judgments justified belief justified in believing justified in holding justified moral belief justified without qualification kind Mackie meta-ethics modest contrast class modestly justified moral assumptions moral claim moral epistemology moral explanations moral facts moral intuitionism moral intuitionists moral intuitions moral nihilism moral nihilists moral sentences morally wrong Nonetheless normative person problem Pyrrhonian skeptics Pyrrhonism rational reason to believe regress argument relevant contrast class reliable rule out moral second-order beliefs seems semantic Sinnott-Armstrong skeptical hypotheses substantive moral supervenience supposed suppressed premise suspend belief truth-aptness