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Volume 13 Number 1
The Conditions of Convergence
Overlapping Generations RandomlyFurcating Stochastic
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actual domain AD3t anatomy of games Arg max assignment game behavior mechanism best reply characterization conflicts consider consistency axiom consumers cooperation core D.W.K. Yeung decision elements define Definition dominance elimination dynamics elimination procedure equivariant exist extractors fc+i feasible pay-off vector firms forming winning strategies function of player furcating stochastic differential game horizon Game Theory ha(t habitual domains Hamiltonian systems individual rationality instantaneous payoff interaction interval tk interval tk,tk+ ip(M J0rgensen and Yeung Lemma living domains market game Mathematics maximal Nash equilibrium controls Nova Science Publishers occurs Oligopoly outcomes paper Pareto dominates Pareto optimality price convergence problem producers Proof proportional rationing rule Proposition random variable reachable domain reduced game reframing reservation prices residual demand resource extraction S+(p Section solution ip SPB solution stochastic differential games subset Theorem um,vw unit costs value function vector of Nash win-win win-win strategies