The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASAWhen the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. In The Challenger Launch Decision, Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skulduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster is a story not of evil but of the banality of organizational life. This powerful work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be reexamined and offers an unexpected warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age. |
What people are saying - Write a review
LibraryThing Review
User Review - nandadevi - LibraryThingThe Challenger Space Shuttle disaster has become a favoured model for management gurus who talk glibly about amoral decision making, internal communication failures and the normalisation of aberrance ... Read full review
LibraryThing Review
User Review - PointedPundit - LibraryThingInstitutions Create and Condone Risk The Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986. To millions of viewers, it is a moment they will never forget. Official inquiries into the accident ... Read full review
Contents
THE EVE OF THE LAUNCH | 1 |
TWO LEARNING CULTURE REVISING HISTORY | 33 |
IZATION OF DEVIANCE | 77 |
rlVe THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 198 s | 153 |
SIX THE CULTURE OF PRODUCTION | 196 |
Seven structural secrecy | 238 |
tlOjir THE EVE OF THE LAUNCH REVISITED | 278 |
Nllie CONFORMITY AND TRAGEDY | 334 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
acceptable risk accountability actions administrators analysis asked assessment belief Boisjoly booster calculation cause Center Challenger charts cold concern conclusion Congress Constraint construction continued cost created culture decision delay disaster discussion effect erosion expected experience failure field flight force going House Ibid increased indicated interpretation interview transcript issue January joint launch Level managers March Marshall Marshall's meaning meeting mission Morton Thiokol Mulloy NASA NASA's normal nozzle O-ring occurred official operational organization organizational original participants performance position possible Powers presented Presidential Commission pressure primary problem procedures production Program Project question rationale Readiness recommendation redundancy Report response result ring rules safety schedule Science seal secondary shows shuttle signals situation social Space SRB joint structure technical teleconference temperature tests thing Thiokol engineers tion understand violations
Bibliographic information
| Title | The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA History e-book project |
| Author | Diane Vaughan |
| Contributor | American Council of Learned Societies |
| Edition | illustrated, reprint |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press, 1996 |
| ISBN | 0226851761, 9780226851761 |
| Length | 575 pages |
| Subjects | › › Social Science / Sociology / General Technology & Engineering / Aeronautics & Astronautics Technology & Engineering / General Technology & Engineering / History |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |