What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
actions ęsthetic affections already amongst appears Beauty Benevolence called cause character Church College considerable criticism death desire difficulty distinct doubt Dublin edition election Essay ethical evidence excellence expression fact faculty favour feeling force Francis friends further give given Glasgow Greek hand Happiness harmony History human Hume Hutcheson Ibid idea ideal important individual influence Inquiry interest John kind late later lectures Leechman letter matter mentioned mind Moral Philosophy Moral Sense natural never object opinions original Passions period Philosophy pleasure position present principle probably Professor published question reason reference relation remains remarks result says Scotland seems Sermons Shaftesbury side Smith speaks supra System teaching theory things thought tion true University Virtue whole writes written
Page 279 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Page 197 - From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting self, and as respecting society, it will plainly appear, that there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow creatures; as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good: and that the same objections lie against one of these assertions, as against the other.
Page 170 - In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject...
Page 165 - Will it not be found in this respect, above all, "that what is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is, of consequence, agreeable and good?
Page 162 - If eating and drinking be natural, herding is so too. If any appetite or sense be natural, the sense of fellowship is the same. If there be anything of nature in that affection which is between the sexes, the affection is certainly as natural towards the consequent offspring ; and so again between the offspring themselves, as kindred and companions, bred under the same discipline and economy.
Page 82 - following two false and dangerous doctrines: first, that the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and second, that we could have a knowledge of good and evil without and prior to a knowledge of God" (Rae, Life of Adam Smith, 1895).
Page 157 - ... mind more comprehensive, you generously seek that which is highest in the kind. Not captivated by the lineaments of a fair face, or the welldrawn proportions of a human body, you view the life itself, and embrace rather the mind...
Page 37 - Ireland, sent his private secretary to inquire at the bookseller's for the author ; and when he could not learn his name, he left a letter to be conv.eyed to him : in consequence of which Mr.
Page 165 - Like that sovereign artist or universal plastic nature, he forms a whole, coherent and proportioned in itself, with due subjection and subordinacy of constituent parts. He notes the boundaries of the passions, and knows their exact tones and measures; by which he justly represents them, marks the sublime of sentiments and action, and distinguishes the beautiful from the deformed, the amiable from the odious.