Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of FoundationalismFoundationalism, as a theory of justification and knowledge, is often associated with Enlightenment rationality, the Cartesian thirst for certainty, and the modern assumption of the objectivity and universality of reason. Because of these associations, scholars in various fields have disdained foundationalism in favor of some sort of non-foundationalist/post-modern approach to knowledge and justification. This present book is one piece of a much wider conversation that hopes to motivate a renewed look at foundationalism. Of course, the foundationalism on offer has settled down quite a bit from its surly forbears. This more mild-mannered foundationalism suggests that our beliefs about reality can be held with confidence and yet these beliefs remain open to criticism and revision. It is this type of epistemology that provides a constructive basis for investigation and research while nevertheless encouraging a cognitive humility about our claims to possess truth. |
Contents
The Nature and Value of Epistemic Justification | 7 |
Foundationalism and the Regress Arguments | 31 |
The Given Element of Perceptual Experience | 55 |
BonJours Foundationalism | 73 |
Defending Direct Realism | 91 |
Concepts and the World | 117 |
Restoring the Foundations | 139 |
Bibliography | 165 |
| 171 | |
| 173 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actually Alston appear belief-set BonJour C. I. Lewis causal information claim cognitive coherence coherentism coherentist conceptualist conceptualized awareness conceptualized perceptual awareness Davidson digital explanations direct object direct realist empirical beliefs epis epistemic justification epistemic regress epistemic status Epistemology Ernest Sosa external world externalist Fido foundationalism foundationalist Fred Dretske fulfillment given grounds illusion inferentially justified jar of gumballs justifica justified beliefs justified in believing knowledge Laurence BonJour McDowell mental metaphysical mind mind-world mind/brain nature non-inferentially justified non-veridical notion object of perception occurrent belief one's ontological perceiver perceptual awareness perceptual experience perceptual object phenomenological Philosophical physical objects problem propositions quasi-commonsensical reality reason reflective justification reflectivist regress argument representation representationalism representationalist requirement seems Sellars Sellars's sense experience sensory experience temic theory of concepts theory of justification theory of perception thesis things thought tion true belief truth truth-indicative University Press veridical perception William Alston world of physical