Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

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Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005 - Philosophy - 256 pages
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This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
 

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Contents

Incompatibilism
3
11 The Value of Free Will
5
12 Minimal Incompatibilism
7
13 Narrow and Broad Incompatibilism
9
Active Control and Causation
13
22 Noncausal Libertarian Accounts
15
221 ReasonBased Active Control
17
223 ReasonExplanation
19
65 DifferenceMaking and Attributability
106
66 The Presumption of Openness
110
67 Summing Up
114
The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions
117
72 Willist vs Actionist Views
119
73 Directly Free Overt Action
120
732 Acting Overtly as One Has Decided
121
74 Intentions Decisions and Actions Other Than Decisions
122

23 Causal Libertarian Accounts
23
EventCausal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation
27
31 Some Objections Concerning Explanation and Their Significance
29
32 Indeterminism and Causation
30
33 Indeterminism and Rational Explanation
32
332 Acting for a Reason
35
34 Indeterminism and Contrastive Rational Explanation
37
341 An Account of Contrastive Causal Explanation
38
342 Contrastive Rational Explanation
40
343 Contrastive Explanatory Relevance
43
344 A Second View
46
35 Some Additions to the Unadorned View
47
352 Plural Rationality and Wanting More
50
Deliberative Libertarian Accounts
55
412 Mele
57
413 Ekstrom
58
42 Is This Enough?
59
422 DifferenceMaking
60
423 A Reasonable Preference
63
43 An Unsuccessful Attempt to Evade a Problem
64
The Problem of Diminished Control
69
52 The Ensurance Argument
72
53 The Argument from Luck
75
54 A Sophisticated Centered Account
80
542 Wanting More
82
543 Indeterminacy
84
544 Efforts to Decide
85
545 Parallel Processing
90
The Problem of Value
91
61 Alternatives Rationality and Probability
92
62 Active Control and Openness
93
63 The NoChoice Argument
95
64 Free Will and Responsibility
99
641 Narrow and Broad Incompatibilism
100
642 The Same Verdict with Regard to a More Sophisticated View
105
75 Decisions and Our Rationality through Time
124
An Integrated AgentCausal Account
131
81 Agent Causation and ReasonExplanation
133
82 A Recent Version of the Traditional Account
136
83 Agent Causation and Event Causation
142
84 What Is Directly AgentCaused?
146
Agent Causation and Control
149
91 An Agents Causing an Action
151
912 Can an Agents Causing an Event Be EventCaused?
152
92 Van Inwagens NoChoice Argument Again
157
932 An Uncertain Situation
166
94 Strawsons Impossibility Argument
168
942 Indeterminism Full Rationality and Active Control
171
95 Active Control with Integration
175
953 A Law of Agent Causation
179
Substance and Cause
183
1011 Dispositionalism
186
1012 Relationalism
188
102 Exercised at Will and Purposively
191
103 Objections to the Possibility of Substance Causation
194
1031 Laws and Conditionals
195
1033 Explanation
197
1O34 Time
199
1O35 Probability
201
1036 Structure
202
1037 Directedness
203
1038 Discovery
204
1039 Immanent Substance Causation
205
10311 Summing Up
207
104 Human Substances
208
Physicalism and Agent Causation
210
Conclusion
217
References
221
Index
233
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