Studies in Subjective ProbabilityHenry Ely Kyburg, Howard Edward Smokler |
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Page 66
... finite probability relation ; and it is hard to suppose that as we accumulate instances there is suddenly a point , say after 233 instances , at which the probability relation becomes finite and so comparable with some numerical ...
... finite probability relation ; and it is hard to suppose that as we accumulate instances there is suddenly a point , say after 233 instances , at which the probability relation becomes finite and so comparable with some numerical ...
Page 81
... finite number of alternatives . It can consider questions to which an infinite number of answers are possible , but in order to consider the answers it must lump them into a finite number of groups . The difficulty becomes practically ...
... finite number of alternatives . It can consider questions to which an infinite number of answers are possible , but in order to consider the answers it must lump them into a finite number of groups . The difficulty becomes practically ...
Page 169
... finite sets of trials — all that we can actually observe — and the mathematical ideali- zation of frequency . Analysis reveals that the only possible link is bound to involve the intuitive idea of probability.10 Granting then the ...
... finite sets of trials — all that we can actually observe — and the mathematical ideali- zation of frequency . Analysis reveals that the only possible link is bound to involve the intuitive idea of probability.10 Granting then the ...
Contents
THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF PROBABILITY | 17 |
APROPOS OF A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY | 45 |
TRUTH AND PROBABILITY | 61 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
according apply assertion axioms Bayesian belief of degree bets bility calculus of probability coherence concept of probability conclusion condition consider consistency corresponding defined definition degree of belief depend determined distribution function E₁ equally probable evaluation of probabilities example exchangeable events exchangeable random quantities experience fact false Finetti finite formal logic frequency frequency theory frequentist give given hypothesis independent individual induction judgment justified Keynes Kyburg L. J. Savage large numbers law of large laws less likelihood principle logical relations mathematical meaning measure mind nature objective observed occur opinion partial belief particular personal probability philosophy point of view possible precise prediction principle proba probabilités probability distribution probability relations problem problem of induction question random variable reasons reference regard result sense sequence simple statement statistical inference statisticians subjectivistic theory sufficient suppose theorem theory of probability tion trials true