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abstract name affirmed or denied analysis animal antecedent Archbishop Whately ascer ascertained assertion attri axioms believe body called carbonic acid causation cause circumstances coexistence colour common conceive conception conclusion concrete name connotative name consequent considered copula deductive definition denote differentia distinction doctrine Duke of Wellington effect ellipse equal essence evidence example exist experience explain expression fact feelings genus geometry ground idea implied individual induction inference inquiry instance kind knowledge known language laws logic logicians major premiss mark matter meaning mental merely Method of Agreement Method of Difference mind mode mortal motion nature necessary object observed particular peculiar person pheno phenomena phenomenon philosophers possess predicate principle produced properties proposition proved purpose quadruped ratiocination reasoning relation resemblance rience scientific sensations sense signification Socrates species substances supposed syllogism term theory things thought tion true truth universal proposition Whewell word
Page 394 - If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.
Page 335 - To certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, will continue to, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause ; the invariable consequent the effect. And the universality of the law of causation consists in this, that every consequent is connected in this manner with some particular antecedent or set of antecedents.
Page 315 - Whatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition that the course of nature is uniform is the fundamental principle, or general axiom, of Induction. It would yet be a great error to offer this large generalisation as any explanation of the inductive process. On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an instance of induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious kind. Far from being the first induction we make, it is one of the last, or at all events one of those which...
Page 407 - Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.
Page 322 - Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction ; while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a very little way towards establishing a universal proposition ? Whoever can answer this question, knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the problem of induction.
Page 336 - The real cause is the whole of these antecedents ; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others.
Page 343 - The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows.
Page 436 - The business of Inductive Logic is to provide rules and models (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination) to which if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive, and not otherwise.