Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey 
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Review: Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey
User Review  Bruce  GoodreadsThis is an advanced game theory text. Readers should be prepared to chew on the math behind decision making strategies and rationality. Were I more math inclined, I'm sure I would've loved this book ... Read full review
Review: Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey
User Review  GoodreadsThis is an advanced game theory text. Readers should be prepared to chew on the math behind decision making strategies and rationality. Were I more math inclined, I'm sure I would've loved this book ... Read full review
Contents
CHAPTER  1 
Utility Theory  12 
Extensive and Normal Forms  39 
Copyright  
45 other sections not shown
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Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey Robert Duncan Luce,Howard Raiffa Limited preview  1957 
Common terms and phrases
alternatives analysis arbitrated solution arbitration scheme argument assumed assumption axioms behavioral strategies Chapter characteristic function choose coalition structure collusion concept condition conflict of interest consider cooperative game decision denote discussion dominates economic equilibrium pairs equilibrium point equilibrium strategy equivalent example exists expected value extensive form finite number gamble game in extensive game theory game tree given imputations indifferent individual information sets interpersonal comparisons least linear utility function lottery mathematical maximin strategy maximize minimax mixed strategy move ntuple Nash Nash's negotiation set Neumann and Morgenstern noncooperative game normal form notion outcome Pareto optimal parlor games payoff matrix play player 2's possible preplay communication prisoner's dilemma probability distribution pure strategy rational reasonable restricted security level sense Shapley Shapley value side payments situation social stable strategy choice strictly competitive games subsets theorem theory of games tion tive twoperson games twoperson theory unique utility theory yields zerosum game