Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

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Cambridge University Press, Aug 13, 1998 - History - 428 pages
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In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organisation and styles of operations.

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The development of amphibious
The British American and German
The German British and American
The British American
The submarine problem Germany
Patterns of military innovation in the interwar period 329

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About the author (1998)

Williamson Murray is Professor Emeritus in the Department of History at Ohio State University and the Ambassador Anthony D. Marshall Chair of Strategic Studies at Marine Corps University, as well as a defense consultant and commentator on historical and military subjects in Washington, DC. His most recent books are Successful Strategies (edited with Richard Hart Sinnreich) and The Iran-Iraq War (written with Kevin Woods), both published by Cambridge in 2014, and War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness and Military Adaptation in War, both published by Cambridge in 2011. He is co-editor of numerous books of military and international history, including Hybrid Warfare (with Peter Mansoor, Cambridge, 2012), The Shaping of Grand Strategy (with Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey, Cambridge, 2011), The Making of Peace (with James Lacey, Cambridge, 2008), The Past as Prologue (with Richard Hart Sinnreich, Cambridge, 2006), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300 2050 (with MacGregor Knox, Cambridge, 2001), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (with Allan R. Millett, Cambridge, 1996), and The Making of Strategy (with Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox, Cambridge, 1994).

Millett is Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Professor of Military History at The Ohio State University.

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