The Uses of ArgumentTraditionally, logic has been claimed to be 'the science of rational argument', but the relevance to our everyday disputes of the formal logician's results has remained unclear. The abstract character of traditional logic cuts the subject off from practical considerations; Mr Toulmin enquires why this is so, and shows how an alternative conception can be of more general value. Starting from an examination of the actual procedures in different fields of argument - the practice, as opposed to the theory, of logic - he discloses a richer variety than is allowed for by any available system. He argues that jurisprudence rather than mathematics should be the logician's model in analysing rational procedures, and that logic should be a comparative and not a purely formal study. These suggestions lead to conclusions which many will consider controversial; though they will also be widely recognized as interesting and illuminating. This book extends into general philosophy lines of enquiry already sketched by Mr Toulmin in his earlier books on ethics and the philosophy of science. The ordinary reader will find in it the same clarity and intelligibility; and the professional philosopher will acknowledge the same power to break new ground (and circumvent old difficulties) by posing fresh and stimulating questions. |
Contents
Fields of Argument and Modals | 11 |
The Phases of an Argument | 15 |
Impossibilities and Improprieties | 21 |
Force and Criteria | 28 |
The FieldDependence of Our Standards | 33 |
Questions for the Agenda | 36 |
Probability | 41 |
I Know I Promise Probably | 44 |
The Peculiarities of Analytic Arguments | 118 |
Some Crucial Distinctions | 125 |
The Perils of Simplicity | 131 |
Working Logic and Idealised Logic | 135 |
An Hypothesis and Its Consequences | 136 |
The Verification of This Hypothesis | 143 |
The Irrelevance of Analytic Criteria | 153 |
Logical Modalities | 156 |
Improbable But True | 49 |
Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims | 53 |
The Labyrinth of Probability | 57 |
Probability and Expectation | 61 |
ProbabilityRelations and Probabilification | 66 |
Is the Word Probability Ambiguous? | 69 |
ProbabilityTheory and Psychology | 77 |
The Development of Our ProbabilityConcepts | 82 |
The Layout of Arguments | 87 |
Data and Warrants | 89 |
Backing Our Warrants | 95 |
Ambiguities in the Syllogism | 100 |
The Notion of Universal Premisses | 105 |
The Notion of Formal Validity | 110 |
Analytic and Substantial Arguments | 114 |
Logic as a System of Eternal Truths | 163 |
SystemBuilding and Systematic Necessity | 174 |
The Origins of Epistemological Theory | 195 |
Further Consequences of Our Hypothesis | 201 |
Transcendentalism | 206 |
Phenomenalism and Scepticism | 211 |
Substantial Arguments Do Not Need Redeeming | 214 |
The Justification of Induction | 217 |
Intuition and the Mechanism of Cognition | 221 |
The Irrelevance of the Analytic Ideal | 228 |
Conclusion | 233 |
| 239 | |
| 241 | |
Common terms and phrases
A's are B's accept analytic arguments analytic syllogism answer applied argue Aristotle assertion assessment Bermuda Budge Patty Carnap certainly claims to knowledge concerned conclusion contradiction crews criteria data and backing datum Davis Cup deductive Descartes different fields discussion distinction entail entitled epistemology essay event evidence expressed fact field-dependent fields of argument force formal logic formally valid geometry grounds ical implies impossibility inductive inference instance involved J. L. Austin Jack's sisters justified kind Kneale Kneale's logical theory logical type logicians meaning ments mistaken modal terms moral nature necessity notion once ourselves particular Petersen philosophers philosophy of probability phrase position possible practical practical argument prediction present probability-statements problem procedures propositions psychological pure mathematics question rational reason recognised red hair regatta relevant sense sort standards statements step Stephen Toulmin substantial arguments talk tautology things tion type-jump utterances warrant winner of Heat word probability