the fort opened its fire upon the gun-boats, sunk one, and occasioned some loss in others. Lord Blayney advanced close to the works, for the purpose of drawing the enemy's attention from the water: here he was contending with musquetry against grape-shot and stone walls. Major Grant was mortally wounded in this unequal engagement, and several men killed; but the riflemen did their part well; the enemy's guns were for a time silenced, the boats took their stations, and he withdrew the troops. He now directed the Spaniards to the summit of a hill, with a ravine in front, which would have been a sufficient protection from any sudden attack; but the Spanish Colonel objected that it was Sunday, and that it was not the custom of his countrymen to fight upon that day. These Spaniards were not in good humour with their allies, nor perhaps with the service, for which they had been taken from their comfortable quarters at Ceuta : by a misarrangement arising from mere inattention, they had been served in the transport with meat on a meagre day; and they were discontented also because there was no priest embarked with them. Lord Blayney, however, prevailed upon the Commandant to detach four companies, for the purpose of occupying a pass near Mijas, and preventing the enemy in that town from sending assistance to the fort. A hundred Germans were added to this detachment; the English officer who conducted this service was persuaded by the Spaniards to attack the town, though his orders were to act on the defensive; the consequence was, that he was repulsed, and obliged rapidly to fall back on the main body. During the night, the men were exposed, without shelter, to a continual heavy rain, such as is common at that season in those countries, and is the expedinever seen in our climate, except sometimes during the short duration of a thunder-storm. It was

Failure of

tion.

Oct. 15.

But the night was ac

accompanied with thunder now. tively employed in landing artillery; which could not be done by day, because the guns of the castle completely commanded the beach. Soldiers and sailors exerted themselves heartily; and before day-break a battery for one thirty-two pound carronade was completed on the shore, and another for two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, on a rocky hill, 350 yards from the castle. Though the artillery could not make impression upon the solid old masonry of the walls, it destroyed part of the parapet, and the musquetry did such execution, that Lord Blayney entertained good hope of success; when, to his surprise, he learnt that the garrison had been reinforced before his arrival, that it was in sufficient strength for him to expect that a sortie would be made, and that Sebastiani was on the way from Malaga with 4700 foot, 800 horse, and sixteen pieces of artillery; . . his own force amounted only to 1400 men, and the four guns which had been landed. These he could not reembark under the fire of the castle, and he would not abandon; and at this time, just as he was about to strengthen his position, by occupying a ruined tower, the Rodney, and a Spanish line-of-battle ship, appeared off the coast, with the eighty-second regiment, 1000 strong, to reinforce him. Boats were sent off to assist in landing them, and Lord Blayney was about to station gun-boats so as to rake the beach; but before either object could be effected, some 600 infantry, and sixty horse, sallied from the castle. It was a complete surprise; the British troops were in front, taking provisions; the enemy made their attack on the Spaniards and the foreigners on the left these men took to flight, and abandoned the battery. At this moment the troops had pushed off from the ships, and Lord Blayney, trusting in them and in the strength of his position, formed the few British soldiers

who were with him, and retook the guns by the bayonet, but not before part of the ammunition had been blown up. A doubt was now entertained whether some troops who were moving toward them upon the left were friends or foes; some said they were Spaniards; the German deserters declared them to be French. The hesitation and delay which this doubt occasioned enabled the enemy (for enemies they were) to approach without opposition; and when Lord Blayney, having ascertained the Lord Blaytruth too late, charged them, the conflict ended ney and the in his being made prisoner, with about 200 men, troops some forty having been killed. This was the taken. fate of the English soldiers; most of the deserters went over to the enemy. The men who were in the boats had then no course left but to return to the ships, fortunate in having thus seen the termination of an ill-planned expedition, without being farther engaged in it.

British

Defeat of
General

Blake.

It had not been supposed that Sebastiani could bring together so large a body of men as he had put in motion on this occasion. Some movement was expected from the inhabitants of Malaga, but with little reason; for the individuals who had exerted themselves most in resisting the entrance of the enemy into that city were, such of them as escaped from the slaughter, at this time in prison, with their leader, Colonel Avallo, upon some of those vague charges which, in Spain, under any of its Governments, were deemed sufficient grounds for throwing men into a dungeon, and leaving them there. It had been intended also that Sebastiani's attention should have been called off in a different direction, by Blake, with the central army. That army was too slow in its movements to produce any effect in favour of Lord Blayney's attempt; its headquarters at this time were at Murcia, and its advance at Velez el Rubio. It was not till a fortnight after the

Nov. 3.

failure at Frangerola, that the French thought it necessary to take any measures against this ill-disciplined, ill-appointed, ill-constituted body. The enemy's troops were so distributed, that a considerable force could be assembled, within twenty-four hours, at any point where their presence was required; but before Sebastiani could reach Baza, General Rey, with one regiment of dragoons, a regiment of Polish lancers, and a detachment of infantry, had routed an army which was exposed in a place without protection, and was completely broken at the first charge*. Between 1000 and 2000 were killed, and some 1200 taken; the officers here behaved better than the men, for the latter threw down their arms, and cried for quarter; while, of the former, all who were made prisoners had received sabre wounds. The prisoners were in a miserable condition, appearing half starved and half naked; a large portion of them consisted of old men and boys, and those who could not keep pace with their escort were shot upon the way.

Irregular

war.

Not discouraged by these repeated losses and multiplied disgraces the Spaniards continued to pursue that system of hostility which was carried on wherever the French were nominally masters of the country; a mode of war destructive to the invaders against whom it was directed, but dreadful also in its effect upon the people by whom it was waged. The Junta of Seville had, from the beginning of the struggle, perceived that the strength of Spain lay in her people, and not in her armies. The Central Junta also had early acknowledged the importance of that irregular and universal warfare for which the temper of the

See vol. i.

*No account (as far as I can discover) of this disgraceful action was published by the Spanish Government. There was no longer the same

magnanimity in relating its misfortunes as in the days of the Central Junta.

Spaniards and the character of the country were equally adapted; and they attempted to regulate it by a long edict, giving directions for forming Partidas of volunteers, and Quadrillas, which were to consist of smugglers, appointing them pay, enacting rules for them, and subjecting them to military law; but it is manifest that these restrictions would only be observed where the Government had sufficient authority to enforce them, which was only where they had armies on foot, and that when thus restricted, little was to be done by it. They spoke with a clear understanding of the circumstances in which Spain was placed when they proclaimed a Moorish war*, and bade the Spaniards remember in what manner their fathers had exterminated a former race of invaders. The country, they said, was to be saved by killing the enemies daily, just as they would rid themselves of a plague of locusts; a work which was slow, but sure, and in its progress would bring the nation to the martial pitch of those times, when it was a pastime to go forth and seek the Hagarenes. They reminded them of the old Castilian names, for skirmishes †, ambushments, assaults, and stratagems, the necessary resources of domestic warfare, and told them that the nature of the country and of the inhabitants rendered Spain invincible.

This character, on the part of the Spaniards, the war had now assumed in all parts of Spain. The French were no sooner masters of the field, than they found themselves engaged in a wearing, wasting contest, wherein discipline was of no avail, and by which, in a country of such extent and natural strength, any military power, however great, must ultimately be con

* Guerra de Moros contra estos infideles.

Escaramuzas, celadas, rebatos, ardides,-son nombres castellanos de la antigua milicia, la mas necessaria en la guerra domestica.