The Philosophy of Science
Oxford University Press, 1996 - Science - 339 pages
The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. The contributors ask whether we are justified in believing scientific theories and what attitude we should take to them if we are not. Although few philosophers seriously question the existence of everyday objects like trees and tables, many have real doubts about viruses, electrons, and gravitational waves. The last two decades have seen important new work in the philosophy of science, stimulated by sceptical attitudes towards scientific theories. Scientific realist have in turn countered with arguments of their own, resultingin a wide-ranging debate drawing from many different philosophical disciplines. The Philosophy of Science bridges the gap between both sides of the argument, including articles ondifferent species of realism and anti-realism, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, the lessons of the history of science, naturalized epistemology of science, and Bayesian methodology.
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The Natural Ontological Attitude
NOAs ArkFine for Realism
11 other sections not shown
accept aims alternative anti-realism anti-realist approximately true argue argument from underconsideration assumption Bayes's theorem Bayesian best explanation Boyd causal claim conception confirmation theory constructive empiricism core position correspondence degrees of belief earlier theories Einstein empirically adequate empirically equivalent empiricism empiricist entails epistemic epistemology equations ether evaluation evidence example existence explanatory fact false Fraassen Fresnel's history of science hypothesis inductive inference internal realist judgements kind knowledge Kuhn Laudan laws likelihood logical metaphysical methodological rules methods model theories natural ontological attitude nature Newton's notion objection ontology phenomena philosophical Philosophy of Science physics plausible positivist possible posterior probability postulated premiss principles prior probabilities problem Putnam quantum mechanics question rational realist realist's explanation reality reason reject relations relevant sceptical scientific realism scientific theories scientists sense sort statements strategy structure successful theories suppose theoretical entities theoretical equivalence theory of truth thesis tion underdetermination University unobservable values