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action actual admit adoption appears appetite Aristotle ascer assumption attainment aversion balance of happiness Bentham Book causes cerned chap chapter cognition Common Sense commonly conceive conception conflict connexion consciousness consequences consider definite degree desire determine Determinist discussion distinguish doubt duty effect Egoistic Hedonism element emotional Epicureanism existence experience feeling fundamental greatest happiness habit hedonistic human Hypothetical Imperatives ideal implied important impulse individual Intuitional Intuitionism J. S. Mill judge kind latter less Libertarian mankind means merely mind moral judgments moralists motive nature notion º º object observe ordinary particular particular judgments Perfection persons pleasant pleasure and pain possible practical present principles prompt proposition psychological Hedonism pursuit question rational realisation recognised regard relation result right conduct rules seems self-love sentiment social Social Statics stimulate suppose term thought tion treatise ulterior ultimate end ultimately reasonable uncon Utilitarianism valid virtue virtuous volition y force
Page 191 - ... if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavours to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and if the states of consciousness which it endeavours to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial.
Page 387 - The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.
Page 411 - By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.
Page 387 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Page xvii - I know nothing that could, in this view, be said better, than " do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you...
Page 416 - ... the point up to which, on Utilitarian principles, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible, as appears to be often assumed by political economists of the school of Malthus - but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum.
Page 210 - Thus it has been completely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the same principle. If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us...
Page 120 - Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."t * See not E, at the end of this Preface.
Page 379 - I pointed out that whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances.