Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Reviews the circumstances surrounding the Challenger accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident. Develops recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission1s findings and determinations. Color photos, charts and tables.
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abort aft field joint Aldrich analysis anomalies April assembly astronauts blow-by Boisjoly brake Chairman Rogers Challenger accident changes Commission Hearing Transcript concern contractor crew damage degrees Fahrenheit Director documents External Tank Fahrenheit failure February February 26 flight rate Flight Readiness Review hardware ignition inches indicated January January 28 joint rotation joint seal Kennedy Space Center Kilminster landing launch constraint leak check Level loads McDonald mission 51-L Morton Thiokol MSFC Mulloy NASA NASA's nozzle joint O-ring erosion O-ring seal Operations Orbiter Panel pre-launch pressure primary O-ring problem propellant putty quality assurance range safety recommendation redundancy Reinartz reliability and quality Report result right Solid Rocket ring Roger Boisjoly satellite schedule secondary O-ring segments Shuttle program sion Solid Rocket Booster Solid Rocket Motor Space Shuttle Space Shuttle Challenger Space Shuttle Program structural Team temperature thrust tion vehicle
Page 94 - Wiggins, Joe, I, manager of engineering design, the manager of applied mechanics. On the chart. Before the Commission on February 25, 1986, Mr. Lund testified as follows regarding why he changed his position on launching Challenger during the management caucus when he was asked by Mr. Mason "To take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat":
Page 1 - connected with the mission to investigate it. The mandate of the Commission was to: 1. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and 2. Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission's findings and determinations.
Page 160 - The panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred to it and shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the hazards of proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety standards, and shall perform such other duties as the Administrator may request.
Page 139 - Analysis of existing data indicates that it is safe to continue flying existing design as long as all joints are leak checked with a 200 psig stabilization pressure, are free of contamination in the seal areas and meet O-ring squeeze requirements • Efforts need to continue at an accelerated pace to eliminate SRM seal erosion
Page 96 - quote I read was: My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April? Mr. McDonald testified to another quote that says: You guys are generating new Launch Commit Criteria. Now, both of those I think kind of go together, and that is what I was saying. I don't know whether that occurred during the caucus or subsequent to.
Page 139 - It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities.
Page 120 - Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Booster problem began with the faulty design of its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management first failed to recognize it as a problem, then failed to fix it and finally treated it as an acceptable flight risk.
Page 82 - testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a
Page 72 - The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.
Page 206 - Executive Order 12546, required Commission members to: (1) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and (2) Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission's findings and determinations. Following