The World Wide Military Command and Control System evolution and effectiveness

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DIANE Publishing, 2000 - 390 pages
Perhaps the best single way to summarize it is to view the book as a bureaucratic or organizational history. What the author does is to take three distinct historical themes-organization, technology, and ideology and examine how each contributed to the development of WWMCCS and its ability (and frequent inability) to satisfy the demands of national leadership. Whereas earlier works were primarily descriptive, cataloguing the command and control assets then in place or under development, The book offers more analysis by focusing on the issue of how and why WWMCCS developed the way it did. While at first glance less provocative, this approach is potentially more useful for defense decision makers dealing with complex human and technological systems in the post-cold-war era. It also makes for a better story and, I trust, a more interesting read. By necessity, this work is selective. The elements of WWMCCS are so numerous, and the parameters of the system potentially so expansive, that a full treatment is impossible within the compass of a single volume. Indeed, a full treatment of even a single WWMCCS asset or subsystem-the Defense Satellite Communications System, Extremely Low Frequency Communications, the National Military Command System, to name but a few-could itself constitute a substantial work. In its broadest conceptualization, WWMCCS is the world, and my approach has been to deal with the head of the octopus rather than its myriad tentacles.
 

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Contents

VII
3
VIII
17
IX
19
X
31
XI
33
XII
49
XIII
51
XIV
69
XXIX
215
XXX
219
XXXI
239
XXXII
241
XXXIII
255
XXXIV
257
XXXV
259
XXXVI
271

XV
71
XVI
91
XVII
94
XVIII
95
XIX
106
XX
117
XXI
134
XXII
137
XXIII
159
XXIV
163
XXV
182
XXVI
185
XXVII
196
XXVIII
199
XXXVII
281
XXXVIII
298
XXXIX
301
XL
312
XLI
315
XLII
329
XLIII
331
XLIV
340
XLV
343
XLVI
358
XLVII
363
XLVIII
377
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Page 359 - Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984).
Page 144 - Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?
Page 359 - James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 158; and Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), p.
Page 145 - We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.
Page 322 - Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Page 68 - The ultimate system as now envisioned will provide a standardized, highly survivable, non-interruptable command capability for a wide range of possible situations, and will provide the national authorities with a number of alternatives through which they may exercise their command responsibilities.
Page xxi - Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 26. 17. Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall', 1967), p. 39. 18. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, "Open Systems Theory," in Oscar Grusky and George A.
Page 95 - Its responsiveness to the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for operations analysis.
Page 10 - As a result of well-meaning attempts to protect traditional concepts and prerogatives, we have impaired civilian authority and denied ourselves a fully effective defense. We must cling no longer to statutory barriers that weaken executive action and civilian authority.
Page 261 - In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex mission.

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