## Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey |

### What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

### Contents

CHAPTER | 1 |

Extensive and Normal Forms | 39 |

TwoPerson ZeroSum Games | 56 |

Copyright | |

40 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey R. Duncan Luce,Howard Raiffa Limited preview - 2012 |

Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey Robert Duncan Luce,Howard Raiffa Limited preview - 1957 |

### Common terms and phrases

alternatives analysis arbitrated solution arbitration scheme argument assumed assumption axioms Chapter characteristic function choose coalition structure collusion concept condition conflict of interest consider cooperative game decision definition denote discussion dominates equilibrium pairs equilibrium point equilibrium strategy equivalent example exists expected value extensive form finite number gamble game in extensive game theory game tree given imputations indifferent individual information sets interpersonal comparisons interpretation intuitive least linear utility function lottery mathematical maximin strategy maximize minimax mixed strategy move n-person game n-tuple Nash Nash's negotiation set Neumann and Morgenstern non-cooperative game normal form notion outcome Pareto optimal payoff matrix play player l's possible postulate preplay communication prisoner's dilemma probability distribution pure strategy rational reasonable restricted security level sense Shapley Shapley value side payments situation social stable strategy choice strictly competitive games subset theorem tion tive two-person games two-person theory unique utility theory yields zero-sum game