Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1Russ Shafer-Landau Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments. in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. - ; Oxford Studies. |
Contents
Normative Guidance | 3 |
Saying what we Mean An Argument against Expressivism | 35 |
Expressivism Yes Relativism No | 73 |
Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value | 99 |
The Meaning of Ought | 127 |
Knowing Enough to Disagree A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument | 161 |
Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts | 195 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept action agent all-out buck-passing Allan Gibbard answer argue argument attitudes belief Blackburn buck-passing account Cambridge claim cognitivist committed correct plans deontic logic direction of fit distinction emotions endorsement envy epistemic epistemology error theory ethics evaluative example explain express expressivism expressivist false feel Gibbard guilt higher-order property Horgan and Timmons human Humean illocutionary act intend internalist interpretation kind Korsgaard matter mean metaethical moral facts moral judgments moral propositions moral realism moral relativism moral sentence moral terms Moral Twin Earth motivational cognitivism Nagel natural negation non-cognitivists non-reductive realism normative concepts normative ethics normative facts normative question normative truths notion objection open question argument ordinary moral discourse partial buck-passing perspectivalist philosophers position practical reason prima-facie provide reasons psychological rational referent relation relevant responses seems sense Simon Blackburn simply sort speakers substantive suggest Suppose theoretical theory things thought true value properties wrong