The Development of Modern Philosophy: With Other Lectures and Essays, Volume 1 |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute abstract according analysis appears axioms body called Cartesian character clearly and distinctly Cogito ergo sum complete conception concrete connected connexion consciousness consequence constitutes corporeal nature corporeal universe Critical notice datum definite Descartes determined divine doctrine doubt essence Euvres experience explanation expression extension fact Fichte finite fundamental ground Hegel ideas implied impossible individual infinite inner intelligible interpretation intuition involved Kant Kant's Kantian kind knowledge Leibniz limited logical Malebranche material mathematical mechanical Medit metaphysical method mind mode monad necessary nexion notion object Œuvres Ontological argument Owens College peculiar perception phil philosophy Plato position possible present principle problem propositions pure real existence reality reason reference reflexion regarded Regulę relation representation represented respect Robert Adamson seems self-consciousness sensation sense sense-perception simple soul space Spinoza Subjective Idealism substance term theory thing-in-itself thinking thought tion truth understanding unity universal Veitch whole wholly
Popular passages
Page 138 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Page 146 - But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 146 - If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity. When reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other.
Page 138 - The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality...
Page 31 - ... for, as we have often said, of nothing there can be no extension. And accordingly, if it be asked what would happen were God to remove from a vessel all the body contained in it, without permitting another body to occupy its place, the answer must be that the sides of the vessel would thus come into proximity with each other.
Page 138 - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Page 31 - For two bodies must touch each other when there is nothing between them, and it is manifestly contradictory for two bodies to be apart, in other words, that there should be a distance between them, and this distance yet be nothing; for all distance is a mode of extension, and cannot therefore exist without an extended substance. XIX. That this confirms what was said of rarefaction. After we have thus remarked that the nature of corporeal substance consists only in its being an extended thing, and...
Page 31 - XVIII. How the prejudice of an absolute vacuum is to be corrected. We have almost all fallen into this error from the earliest age, for, observing that there is no necessary connection between a vessel and the body it contains, we thought that God at least could take from a vessel the body which occupied it, without it being necessary that any other should be put in the place of the one removed. But that we may be able now to correct this false opinion, it is necessary to remark that there is in...
Page 346 - On the other hand, it is equally certain tkat the existence of what is known to us as matter does not depend on our knowledge of it. We do not make matter. Only its appearance as material phenomenon is dependent on us. Hence it follows that, so far as it exists independently of its presentation to a cognitive subject, it cannot have material properties, such as extension, hardness, colour, weight, and the like. It is an agency which is an essential condition of material phenomena, but is not itself...
Page 138 - That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.