Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World
Many of us take it for granted that we ought to cooperate to tackle climate change. But where does this requirement come from and what does it mean for us as individuals trying to do the right thing? Although climate change does untold harm to our fellow humans and to the non-human world, no one causes it on their own and it is not the result of intentionally collective action. In the face of the current failure of institutions to confront the problem, is there anything we can do as individuals that will leave us able to live with ourselves? This book responds to these challenges. It makes a moral case for collective action on climate change by appealing to moralized collective self-interest, collective ability to aid, and an expanded understanding of collective responsibility for harm. It also argues that collective action is something we owe to ourselves, as moral agents, because without it we are left facing marring choices. In the absence of collective action, individuals should focus on trying to promote such action (whether through or by bypassing existing institutions), with a supplementary duty to aid victims directly. The argument is not that we should not be cutting our own emissionsthis can be a vital part of bringing about collective action or alleviating harmbut that such `green lifestyle choices cannot straightforwardly be defended as duties in their own right, and should not take priority over trying to bring about collective change.
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND US Collective selfinterest collective inaction and collective harm
PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES Duties to whom?
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ME What I should do when we fail to act
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MORAL BAGGAGE Collective failure individual costs and marring choices
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achieve action on climate adaptation appeal argues argument argument from moralized avoid Barack Obama Calah capabilities capabilities approach Chapter Six child claim climate change mitigation collective action collective harm compliance condition consequentialist consider cooperate defended deprivation direct duties duty-bearers example fair collective scheme Firstly flourishing fulfilling promotional fundamental interests Gardiner global global-level goal human beings moral impact impersonally moral individual duties individual moral agent individual’s interpersonal intuitions IPCC Jamieson Kerri Woods least lective lives Maltais marring choices mimicking actions mimicking duties mitigate climate change moral duties moralized collective self-interest Moreover mutually dependent no-harm principle non-human animals non-identity problem one’s overall Polluters possible potential collectivity prevent principle of beneficence promotional duties reason risk secure serious harm serious suffering set of individuals Shue significant cost situation Stephen Gardiner Stern Review subset tion victims vidual virtue ethics weak principle weakly collective duty weakly collective responsibility