A Signaling/bonding Model of Employer Finance of General TrainingCenter for Advanced Human Resource Studies, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1988 - Employees - 74 pages |
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2nd period wage access to capital additional transition costs adverse selection apprenticeship average Becker's prediction benefits Bishop capital markets CATHERWOOD LIBRARY coefficients conditional expectation Cornell University dismiss the worker dummies Economic employment expected profit find another job fired firm high school hires household heads Human Resource Studies income increase involuntary termination involuntary turnover job offer keep rate Labor Markets layoff liquidity constraint locus of control marginal cost match Ohio State University on-the-job training order condition payoff period percent Pr(K Pr(S Pr(SK receipt of training reduced rent retention rate risk of dismissal second period wage share the costs signal skills sorting effect specific human capital specific training starting wage stay rate test scores Tokyo Metropolitan University training costs training investments training received utility variables wage elasticities wage growth wage profile wage rates worker's discount factor worker's productivity worker's reputation