History of Federal Government: From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States, Volume 1

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Macmillan and Company, 1863 - Federal government - 721 pages

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f Opposite systems of Centralization aud of Local Freedom indepen
f Disadvantages of large States
r It combines though ill an inferior degree the special advantages
f Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of consider
necessarily injurious 113114
The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government
Its incidental political action 127128
These incongruities less palpable in a religious body
Political nullity of the Council during the greater part
The Epeirot League
Monarchy of Jason B C 372 168
Effects on general Grecian History
Achaia during the Peloponnesian War 240
Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos 162153
Theban Arehou a mere Pageant real power vested in the Polemarchs
Parallel between Thebes in Bceotia and Sparta in Lakonia 177179
Restoration of Thebes by Kassander B C 816
Thales probably intended a true Federal Union 187188
Their real nature not Federal Union but absorption into Olyn
Temporary success of the Federal scheme
Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia B C 351 20720
Apportionment of votes to numbers 211212
Wide spread of Hellenic culture
Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia position of the Antigouid
Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century B C 237238
History of PellenS Tyranny of ChairOn B C 368335 241242
Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War
Of the Achaian Federal Constitution
The League really a National Government
Contrast with Athens the Achaian Constitution a nearer approach
Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting 271274
Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly consequent
The ten Ministers probably chosen from all the Cities indis

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Page 263 - On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will...
Page 263 - Experience will forever admonish them, that on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views, by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic ; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret will be the springs by which its motions...
Page 1 - The name of Federal Government may, in its widest sense, be applied to any union of component members where the degree of union between the members surpasses that of mere alliance, however intimate, and where the degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses anything which can fairly come under the head of merely municipal freedom.
Page 20 - As the natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point, which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand...
Page 71 - THE mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its apponents.
Page 13 - Federation is a form of government in which sovereignty or political power is divided between the central and local governments so that each of them within its own sphere is independent of the...
Page 7 - Commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states with regard to its internal government.
Page 88 - No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establishment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely united.
Page 1 - On the one hand, each of the members of the union must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively.
Page 2 - This complete division of sovereignty we may look upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal. But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems not to have been attained more than four or five times in the history of the world.

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