The Logic of Congressional Action

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Yale University Press, Jul 1, 1992 - Political Science - 282 pages
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Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups or localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this book, the author offers a theory that explains not only why special interest frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. By showing how legislative leaders build coalitions for both types of programs, he illuminates recent legislative decisions in such areas as economic, tax, and energy policy.
 

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Contents

Policy Attributes and Policy Preferences
17
Policy Preferences and Congressional Elections
37
Electoral Calculations and Legislators Decisions
60
Strategies for Coalition Leaders
88
Policy Decisions
119
Economic Policy
149
Tax Policy193
193
Energy Policy
224
Citizens Control of Government
265
Index
277
Copyright

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About the author (1992)

R. Douglas Arnold is William Church Osborn Professor of Public Affairs and Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His books include "The Logic of Congressional Action," which won the 1990 Fenno Prize for the best book in legislative studies, and "Congress and the Bureaucracy.

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