Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty TerrorismThis study evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors - failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information - contribute to intelligence failure. The study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. The study has implications for intelligence reform, information sharing, congressional oversight, and society's expectations about the degree to which the intelligence community can predict or prevent surprise attacks. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure | 2 |
B The New Terrorism | 8 |
C Sources of Intelligence Failure | 15 |
D Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism 19932001 | 20 |
February 26 1993 The World Trade Center | 23 |
B Leadership Failures | 27 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 39 |
B Leadership Failures | 168 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 183 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 190 |
E Analytical Challenges | 197 |
F Was the Failure Avoidable? | 198 |
Surprise and Failure in East Africa | 199 |
September 112001 The Twin Towers | 201 |
B Leadership Failures | 203 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 45 |
E Analytical Challenges | 58 |
F The First Avoidable Surprise? | 61 |
G Conclusion | 63 |
April 19 1995 Oklahoma City | 65 |
B Leadership Failures | 68 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 74 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 77 |
E Analytical Challenges | 103 |
F Conclusion | 105 |
June 25 1996 Khobar Towers Saudi Arabia | 107 |
B Leadership Failures | 114 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 131 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 138 |
E Analytical Challenges | 150 |
F Conclusion | 153 |
August 7 1998 US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania | 161 |
The 1983 Bombing of the US | 166 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 212 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 219 |
E Analytical Challenges | 229 |
F Key Findings Pertaining to 911 | 232 |
Surprise Again and Again | 239 |
A Intelligence Failures | 240 |
B Failures of Public Policy Leadership | 241 |
C Organizational Obstacles | 244 |
D Threat and Warning Information | 248 |
E Analytical Challenges | 249 |
F Policy Recommendations | 252 |
G Final Thoughts on the Inevitability of Surprise | 262 |
H Epilogue | 264 |
GovernmentImposed Restrictions on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations | 267 |
Bibliography | 275 |
| 289 | |
Other editions - View all
Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism Thomas Copeland Limited preview - 2007 |
Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism Thomas E. Copeland No preview available - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
9/11 Commission activities agencies agents al-Qa'ida American April Arab building cell Clinton Committee Congress counter-terrorism Defense Department domestic Downing Report East Africa Elohim City enforcement and intelligence failed federal focused force protection foreign funding hijackings IG/JAG Report incidents intelligence collection intelligence community intelligence failure investigations involved Iran Iranian Iraq Iraqi Islamic Joint Inquiry Kenya Khobar Towers Khobar Towers bombing law enforcement ligence mass casualty McVeigh and Nichols military militia Murrah Muslim National Security Nosair Oklahoma City bombing operations OPM/SANG organizational obstacles Osama Bin Laden Patriot planning plot policy makers political President problems Ramzi Yousef responsibility rorist Saddam Hussein Saudi Arabia Schwalier share Sheikh Sudan supra note surprise surveillance tactical target terrorism terrorist terrorist attacks terrorist groups terrorist threat threat environment Trade Center bombing U.S. Embassy U.S. forces U.S. intelligence U.S. policy United warning indicators Washington World Trade Center York