Energy, Foresight, and Strategy
In Energy, Foresight, and Strategy, Thomas Sargent and his collaborators have produced a highly rigorous treatment of 'rational expectations' theory and its application to the study of energy markets. These six essays use dynamic games to study a variety of issues important to analysts and decisionmakers in the energy field.
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Aiyagari analysis appendix assumed assumption behavior buyer capital characteristic function column competitive equilibrium constraints cost function cumulative decision rules depend derivation difference equation domestic dominant player dominant seller dynamic games Eckstein econometric econometrician economic effect Eichenbaum energy prices Epple equilibrium laws Euler equation exhaustible resource expectations competitive equilibrium exploitation exploration extraction forcing variables forecast game F given Granger-cause Hansen and Sargent Hence implies industry inventories Kydland lag operator lagged laws of motion matrix maximize natural gas prices objective function obtained oil and natural oil prices optimal policy optimal tariff optimization problem output Oynamic period predictions price process production control regime random rational expectations competitive Rational Expectations Models representative firm Roberds sales control regime solution solve solve game specification stochastic process strategic petroleum reserve strategy spaces structural parameters supplier supply shock symmetric games target price tax rates tion ultimate recovery vector zero