and other regional Trauma Centers can be accomplished through coordination with COG. FAA crash fire rescue personnel receive training on a periodic basis in regional exercises, and frequently receive off-airport training from such sources as other fire departments. Periodic disaster drills are conducted by FAA at the Airports for both land and water situations, with the participation of the local agencies and organizations which would become involved in an actual emergency of that nature. FAA is willing to participate in any other regional exercises reasonably related to each airport's situation and response capability. With regard to the Emergency Response Action Plan proposed by COG in January, FAA supports the recommended actions in the plan and will cooperate in any tasks in which we have the ability to contribute. In view of the airports' present communication capabilities and existing mutual aid agreements, we believe the airports are already in substantial compliance with the ultimate goals of the plan. 4. Coordination of Dulles and National Airport public safety officials with their counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions is extensive and successful. This coordination takes several forms. First, Metropolitan Washington Airports is party to several mutual aid agreements with local jurisdictions. Agreements have long existed for fire rescue emergencies with Arlington County, Alexandria, Fairfax County and Loudoun County. A formal agreement has been proposed by FAA to the District of Columbia but has not yet been executed; however, FAA and District public safety personnel routinely cooperate on operational matters by informal agreement. Second, FAA Airport police and crash fire rescue personnel work with the Park Police, the public safety personnel of Northern Virginia local jurisdictions, and the D.C. Harbor Police on a daily basis. Cooperative efforts relate to structural fires, auto accidents, law enforcement incidents, boating emergencies, and other routine emergency response situations. Cooperation may be incident to the mutual aid agreements I have just mentioned or to more informal arrangements. This routine coordination is facilitated by the various networks of mutual frequencies and direct phone lines available between the airports and local public safety units. Third, airport personnel cross-train with public safety personnel of local jurisdictions, so that each has direct knowledge of the equipment and geography which will be encountered in a mutual aid call to the other's jurisdiction. Also, the certification of airport police officers and firefighters as Emergency Medical Technicians by the Commonwealth of Virginia permits airport personnel to share common procedures and terminology with their counterparts in Northern Virginia jurisdictions. Finally, airport public safety officials participate extensively in regional professional associations. For example, Metropolitan Washington Airports crash fire rescue officials participate in the regular meetings of the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs, the Virginia Fire Chiefs, and the COG Fire Chiefs' Committee, including subcommittees on training, communications, and disaster planning. Metropolitan Washington Airports is also a member of the Federal Fire Service Task Group, and our fire chief is presently chairman of that group. In summary, we believe our emergency readiness planning is sound, current, and consistent with overall regional planning. We are well equipped and well trained. More importantly, our public safety people are very proud of their ability to respond quickly and well to emergency situations, we are quick to solicit assistance from our neighbors when we need it, and are also quick to give it when our help is needed by others. That concludes my prepared presentation. I would be pleased to answer any questions the members of the Committee might have at this time. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Wednesday, May 18, 1983 by Patrick S. Korten Executive Assistant Director for Policy and Communications Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee: There are, as you know, a lot of thankless jobs in the government. Those of us at OPM know a lot about that. By the same token, those intrepid forecasters at the National Weather Service have what is perhaps the ultimate thankless job. They are skilled scientists in what is necessarily an inexact science. Indeed, the forecasters had been having a rough time of it. Less than a week before the big storm, they'd talked up a winter storm that purportedly had the potential for as much as a foot of snow, and we got just a few inches. Two days after the storm, they were predicting one to three inches of snow mixed with sleet and freezing rain. My friends at Metro suggested on Sunday afternoon that we shut the government down for Monday based on that forecast. We didn't get a drop. During the several weeks that preceeded the snowstorm of February 11, 1983, it seemed that I could hardly turn around when someone was shouting, "The weathermen are predicting snow again I wonder how far off they'll be this time!" This is not a criticism of the weather forecasters. The Washington, D.C. area is one of the most difficult in the country in which to make a forecast under these conditions, since the movement of the track of storm of only 15 or 20 miles can mean the difference between a foot of snow and nothing at all. In making decisions regarding leave policy for Federal employees in the Washington area, we take all this into account, and make our best judgement as to how things will actually turn out. Whatever procedures we may have for gathering information and coordinating with local governments, in the final analysis, it still comes down to a judgement call when a snowstorm approaches. On February 11, our decision regarding Federal employee leave policy was to implement a "delayed arrival/liberal leave" policy, which allowed each individual employee to make a personal decision about whether the commute he or she faced was advisable that day or not. The next morning, the Washington Post, which is not generally known for endorsements of OPM policy, endorsed our decision, syaing, "there was no overwhelming reason to just give everyone an extra day off..." As they noted, "for most employees, the option to stay home was there from the start." How Hazardous Weather Leave Decisions Are Made Decisions on special leave policies, if any, when severe weather strikes, are made based upon a number of guidelines and procedures. General policy guidance is contained in the Federal Personnel Manual. Procedures for gathering information and coordinating with local governments are arrived at within the Office of Policy and Communications at OPM, and are the result consultation with officials of the D.C. government, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and the National Weather Service. OPM official guidance defines an "emergency situation" as "one which may prevent employees in significant numbers from reporting for work, or may necessitate the closing of Federal activities in whole or in part." It provides that such a situation "must be general rather than personal in scope and impact," and may be caused by such natural events as "heavy snow or severe icing conditions." It states that "usually, significant emergency situations, of the scope and impact reflected in these guidelines, will be the subject of a public declaration of emergency or disaster by approprirate State or local authority." Second, it provides that "the health and safety of employees in these emergency situations is a matter of prime concern to the government." I should note here that the declaration of a "snow emergency" by local jurisdictions in the Washington area is not the sort of public declaration envisioned in the FPM guidance. Here, such a declaration simply means that parking is prohibited on snow emergency routes, and snow tires or chains are required on vehicles which venture out into the snow. These declarations are routinely made even when the snowfall amount is relatively light, and under circumstances which would not justify any special leave policy for Federal workers. How, then, do we decide whether a weather situation merits special attention, and if so, what out-of-the-ordinary policy is needed to deal with it? Certain general principles apply: - Determination that an emergency exists Making this determination is not as simple as it may sound. Our official guidance provides that "Sometimes a condition occurs which leaves no doubt about its severity and potentially adverse effect on employees." Some would argue that was the case on February 11 here in Washington. But the guidance goes on to read, "In other situations, such as rising flood waters or the forecasting of severe weather conditions (emphasis added), a determination must be made on the potentiality of that condition for creating disruption of work or transportation, or hazardous driving conditions." - Decision on Impact of the Condition on the Federal Population Here there are several possible alternatives. Federal offices may be open as usual, they may be open with a "delayed arrival" policy, they may be open with a "liberal leave" policy, or they may be shut down entirely. Information gathering and coordination are the responsibility of my office at OPM. We have established internal procedures which ensure that: - Information is gathered on the weather from the National Weather Service, on road conditions from area highway departments and other appropriate sources in all local jurisdictions, and on the effect which adverse weather may have on mass transit operations from officials of Metro; |