Law Without Truth
This work analyzes the range of philosophical theories of truth, as applied to legal norms, paying particular attention to the distinction between ontological and criteriological definitions. The author reviews correspondence, coherence, consensus and procedural theories, and explores their role in major contemporary accounts of legal argument, particularly those of Habermas, Alexy, Aarnio, Peczenik and Dworkin.
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Analytical and synthetic conceptions of truth
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH
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A.J. Ayer Aarnio Alexy analytical philosophy Apel argument author's italics coerenza cognitive coherence theory coherentism concept of coherence conception of truth consensus theory considered correspondence theory criteria of truth criterion criticism definition of truth deontic discourse ethics divisionist Dworkin epistemological ethical objectivism ethical realism example facts filosofia del diritto formal Gianformaggio Habermas Habermasian hermeneutic idea ideal speech situation idem infra interpretation judgements justice Kalinowski language legal norms Legal Theory linguistic logic MacCormick meaning and criteria metaethical metaphysical Milan Moral Realism Moral Reality Naess natural law neutral notion objective observes ontological Opocher Oxford Peczenik philosophical possible practical predicate principle problem of truth procedural ethics propositions question R.M. Hare rationality Rawls realism reason reference relationship rules semantic semiotic sense sentences social statements substantive teoria theory of truth thesis treats true or false truth as correspondence truth of law truth-value Turin University Press usage validity values verita Viola W.V.O. Quine warranted assertibility