Law Without TruthThis work analyzes the range of philosophical theories of truth, as applied to legal norms, paying particular attention to the distinction between ontological and criteriological definitions. The author reviews correspondence, coherence, consensus and procedural theories, and explores their role in major contemporary accounts of legal argument, particularly those of Habermas, Alexy, Aarnio, Peczenik and Dworkin. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH | 17 |
THE TRUTH OF NORMS ARGUMENTS | 43 |
Copyright | |
17 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
A.J. Ayer Aarnio Alexy analytical philosophy argument coerenza cognitive coherence theory coherentism concept of coherence conception of truth consensus theory considered correspondence theory criteria of truth criterion criticism definition of truth deontic discourse discourse ethics droit Dworkin epistemological ethical objectivism example facts filosofia del diritto Gianformaggio Giuffrè giuridica Habermas Habermasian hermeneutic idea ideal speech situation idem infra interpretation judgements justice Kalinowski language legal norms Legal Theory linguistic logic MacCormick meaning and criteria meaning of truth metaethical metaphysical Milan Moral Realism Næss natural law notion objective observes ontological Opocher Oxford Peczenik philosophical possible practical predicate principle problem of truth procedural ethics propositions question R.M. Hare rationality Rawls realism reason reference relationship rôle Ronald Dworkin rules semantic semiotic sense sentences social substantive theory of truth thesis transl treats true or false truth as correspondence truth of law truth-value Turin University Press usage validity values verità Viola W.V.O. Quine warranted assertibility